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Abstract 
This major research paper looks at how Canadian Supreme Court justices view their role 
in adjudicating reference questions. Comparing the texts of 21 Supreme Court advisory 
opinions across two eras of the Court (Chief Justice Laskin: 1973-1984 and Chief Justice 
McLachlin: 2000-2017), the study examines the use of four narratives – the Guardian of 
the Constitution, Umpire of Federalism, Institutional and Public Will – to determine how 
the Court positions its role vis-à-vis the constitutional order and the other branches of 
government. I use a mixed-method approach that incorporates an empirically oriented 
content analysis of each decision, complemented by four in-depth case studies of 
archetypal narrative displays. While evidence of all four narratives exists across both eras 
of the Court, two – the Guardian of the Constitution and the Umpire of Federalism – 
dominate both sets of judicial writings.  
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Chapter 1 
The Advisory Opinion 
Increasingly, Canadians look to the judiciary, rather than the legislature for finality on 
policy matters.1 While the Westminster parliamentary system dictates that the fusion of 
powers embodied in the executive and legislature are the source of law and policy, the 
rise of divisive partisanship, ideological decision-making and real-time transmission of 
information from parliament to the public renders governments wary of developing 
policies that might be viewed as controversial – particularly in close proximity to an 
election. One of the ways governments have been able to seek out advice on such 
difficult decisions is by having the courts rule on the legality or constitutionality of laws 
(enacted or merely under consideration) and, if needed, return them to the legislature for 
revision, “proofing” or insulating them – at least in part – from scrutiny. The mechanism 
through which executives can do this is referred to as the advisory opinion. 
At the federal level, the advisory opinion or reference question2 is a function of the 
Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) Act, RSC 1985, though similar provisions exist for the 
federal court and the provincial courts of appeal.3 The legislation that governs the 
application of advisory opinions allows the Governor-in-Council (the executive, in a de 
facto sense) in the appropriate jurisdiction to pose questions of legal-political importance 
with the expectation that an advisory opinion will be handed down, guiding the 
government in the legal and constitutional elements of the issue in question. For the 
                                                 
1
 Angus Reid, “Canadians have a more favourable view of their Supreme Court than Americans have of 
their own,” 17 August 2015. Available at: http://angusreid.org/supreme-court/. 
2
 I use the vocabulary of “reference question” to refer to that which is posed by the executive and “advisory 
opinion” to refer to the response provided by the Court. 
3
 The Federal Court can hear questions related to federal boards, tribunals or commissions. All provinces 
have built in similar provisions to their own judicature acts. 
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Supreme Court, this power emanates from section 53 of the Supreme Court Act4, which 
reads, 
53 (1) The Governor in Council may refer to the Court for hearing and consideration 
important questions of law or fact concerning 
(a) the interpretation of the Constitution Acts; 
(b) the constitutionality or interpretation of any federal or provincial legislation; 
(c) the appellate jurisdiction respecting educational matters, by the Constitution 
Act, 1867, or by any other Act or law vested in the Governor in Council; or 
(d) the powers of the Parliament of Canada, or of the legislatures of the provinces, 
or of the respective governments thereof, whether or not the particular power in 
question has been or is proposed to be exercised.5 
The text of section 53 sets out the types of issues that may make up a question asked 
under this section. Yet in truth, the four classes of questions almost cover the gamut of 
political-legal questions: constitutional matters, legislative matters, federal matters and 
institutional matters. Of course, many of these areas are covered in the course of routine 
litigation. However, advisory decisions are unique as they deviate from courts’ traditional 
caseloads in that they are not addressing a previous case or indeed even a “live” or 
concrete legal problem in practice. Rather, courts are often asked to assess a legal 
question in the abstract. In doing so, the courts rely on facts (though their interpretations 
may be disputed) expert testimony (such as affidavits), submissions by counsel, evidence 
(where applicable), case law and their own comprehension of the constitution or a 
relevant piece of legislation under scrutiny.  
                                                 
4
 Supreme Court Act (RSC, 1985, c. S-26).  
5
 Section 53(2) and (3) note that the executive may ask other questions that are deemed important, even if 
they do not refer to constitutional matters. 
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Advisory opinions have typically been viewed as a strategic, political tool of the 
executive. Only the federal government can ask questions directly to the Court (though 
all provinces have built in similar provisions to their own judicature acts that permit them 
to ask questions of their appeal courts and to appeal, by right, those decisions to the 
Supreme Court). In the legal and political science literatures, most analysis of advisory 
opinions consist of single case studies or the political-strategic use of the reference 
question as a technique of blame avoidance or at least deferral of action on controversial 
policy matters.6 Consequently, much has been said on their use for tactical, political 
purposes.7 Such analyses tend to downplay the potential for the advisory opinion to serve 
a laudable political purpose, namely an opportunity for government to engage with the 
judiciary on matters of legality and constitutionality in advance of finalizing laws that 
may benefit from careful legal scrutiny.   
Regardless of the motivations of the executive, much less has been said about the Court’s 
role in providing the opinion. In addition to its many uses for the executive, the advisory 
opinion is also a mechanism through which the judiciary can make its legal opinions 
known. In this view, both branches of government have the potential to be empowered by 
the mechanism of the reference question, though it could also undoubtedly result in 
conflict or fracture between the two branches.8 Such an opportunity presents a unique set 
of considerations for the Court. They are, by tradition at least, somewhat compelled to 
consider and advise on the issue under request and, since 1891, the “advisory only” 
element of the decision has been treated as defunct, meaning that all decisions made by 
the Court in advisory opinions are treated legally binding and treated as the final word on 
                                                 
6
 See Kate Puddister, “Seeking the Court’s Advice: The Politics of the Canadian Reference Power” 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, forthcoming) for an extensive analysis of this political-
strategic dimension. 
7
 For example: Peter W Hogg, and Allison A. Bushell, "The Charter Dialogue between Courts and 
Legislatures, (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn't Such a Bad Thing after All)" Osgoode Hall LJ 35 
(1997): 75; Peter H. Russell, The Court and the Constitution (Kingston ON: Institute of Intergovernmental 
Relations, Queen's University, 1982); Puddister, supra note 6. 
8
 The scope of the courts’ and governments’ rights are set out in the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council’s re References by the Governor-General in Council, [1910] SCJ No. 33, 43 SCR 536, affd [1912] 
AC 571 (PC) (also called “Re References”). 
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that legal issue, even if, according to the letter of the law, they are not.9 The Court also 
maintains a good measure of discretion around how they choose to respond: they are not 
forced to answer the questions as they are laid out, nor are they forced to provide a 
palatable opinion to the executive who requests the opinion. This has the potential to 
create conflict when the Court is asked to speculate on matters that should traditionally 
fall within the scope of such questions that ought to be deliberated and presumably 
answered by the legislature. In this way, it could be said that the reference question forces 
the Court to breach the borders, if not act wholly outside, of its traditional bounds as a 
legal arbiter and wade into the realm of policymaking. 
1.1 Research Question 
In the absence of a formal declaration by the Court about how they view their role in 
rendering advisory opinions, we know little about the Court’s motivations or whether 
they apply what I refer to as “a narrative framework” – or an overarching legal 
understanding communicated in written form – for issuing advice to the executive 
through this format. Even if such a statement did exist, we should entertain the notion 
that there could be a fair amount of variance between individual judges and that some 
evolution of this framework might take place over time as the composition and leadership 
of the Court changes.  
Yet, drawing from the considerable body of literature on the Supreme Court, we can 
hypothesize that there are many ways that the Court could interpret its role in issuing 
opinions: as an instrument of the public will; in terms of its relationship with the 
executive and legislature (as one of three branches of government); as an arbiter of 
federalism; or in its traditional role as the guardian of the constitution. There is, of course, 
no need for the Court to locate solely in one space; rather, it is entirely possible that the 
Court might view its role as multifaceted. Moreover, as the Court operates largely as a 
composite body (though multiple viewpoints are often rendered in decisions), we should 
                                                 
9
 Carissima Mathen, “"The question calls for an answer, and I propose to answer it": The Patriation 
Reference as Constitutional Method” (2011) 54 The Supreme Court Law Review 143-166. 
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account for the possibility that external factors such as large political punctuations (i.e. 
the repatriation of the constitution, the entrenchment of a bill of rights or the passage of 
institutional reform legislation), may cause the Court to change its evaluation framework 
over time, much like the legislature and executive have evolved in the way they distribute 
power and handle legislative matters.10 Indeed, we could also hypothesize that the 
Court’s framework varies from decision to decision as different legal questions 
encourage the Court to engage with different aspects of legal doctrine.  
This study addresses some of the many questions that arise from these considerations. By 
engaging in a comparative analysis of two eras of the Supreme Court – the Laskin Court 
(1973 to 1984) and the McLachlin Court (2000 to 2017) – I seek to understand how 
judges use the text of their advisory opinions to articulate a narrative framework for 
decision-making. Subsequent to this broader analysis, I examine whether the introduction 
of the Constitution Act, 1982 and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms created a pivot 
point for way in which the Court issues advisory opinions. Thus, the examination of the 
Laskin Court which issued 13 advisory opinions (see Appendix A for case listing), 
including the pivotal Patriation Reference11, and sat up until the implementation of the 
Charter in 1984, contrasted with the contemporary McLachlin Court’s 8 advisory 
opinions (see Appendix A for case listing), provides an opportunity for an assessment of 
these issues.12 Following this analysis, I engage in a case study of four of these 
archetypal narrative frameworks in order to expand upon the understanding of the role of 
the Court in advisory opinions.  
Throughout my work, I find that the Court relies predominantly on two narrative 
frameworks: the Guardian of the Constitution and Umpire of Federalism. In doing so, 
                                                 
10
 For an analysis of this evolution, see Donald J. Savoie, Governing from the Centre: The concentration of 
power in Canadian politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999). 
11
 Reference re Resolution to amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 SCR 753. 
12
 A total of 10 provincial references, requested of provincial superior courts, were also issued during 
Laskin’s tenure as chief justice and 5 provincial references during McLachlin’s tenure. These references 
were started and finished in provincial court and were not appealed to a higher court. 
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they firmly entrench the widely held belief in the legal scholarship and legal community 
at large, that the Court views its role somewhat narrowly and endeavours to maintain a 
relatively conservative approach to applying such narrative frameworks (which is not to 
say that the actual outcomes of the decisions are conservative). However, at particular 
moments of social and legal importance, the Court does engage in readings of the law 
that reflect a Public Will or Institutional reading of legislation or the constitution as well.  
  7 
Chapter 1  
The Reference Power – Uses, Abuses and Legal Utility 
The existence of the advisory opinion mechanism is somewhat unique to Canada. 
Although the Supreme Court Act draws the reference feature through emulation of British 
common law, the UK’s reference power is unused in present day. Courts in other 
common law jurisdictions such as New Zealand, Australia and the United States have not 
been empowered to issue advisory opinions (though some individual states do permit 
questions asked by the state legislature or the governor).13 Civil law jurisdictions do have 
similar mechanisms in place to advise governments on constitutional matters,14 however, 
none has the executive-centered approach featured in Canada, which places reference 
questions as the sole prerogative of the executive via the Governor-in-Council (or 
Lieutenant Governor-in-Council for provincial references).15 The Canada-as-a-legal-
outlier motivation alone makes the act of studying advisory opinions an interesting one. 
However, the within-case contrast of how each institution views the advisory opinion is 
equally useful to position the Court’s role in applying this mechanism for constitutional 
and legal study. 
Since the introduction of the Supreme Court Act in 1875, the Court as the final court of 
appeal for Canada, its predecessor, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC), 
and its provincial counterparts have produced over 200 advisory opinions for their 
respective executives. The content of questions has ranged in subject matter from 
                                                 
13
 From Puddister, supra note 6 at 10: “The state constitutions of Colorado, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and South Dakota authorize advisory opinions, while, Alabama 
and Delaware provide the advisory power through statute”. 
14
 Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000). 
15
 Puddister, supra note 6. 
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agricultural or resource policy16, “New Deal”-era social policy17 to institutional reform18. 
While many have had implications across multiple areas of law, most (if not all) have 
focused on questions of constitutional importance.  
Many scholars have opined on the reasons why executives would call upon the judiciary 
to answer constitutional or policy-oriented questions through the mechanism of the 
advisory opinion. It has been the interest of many scholars to point to the strategic 
elements of the reference power, sometimes characterised as the abuses of the availability 
of the reference question. The JCPC itself recognized the potential for this abuse early on, 
citing “mischief and inconvenience […] might arise from an indiscriminate and 
injudicious use of the Act”.19 Smith observes its historical use was largely as an 
alternative or replacement for the disallowance power, permitting federal governments to 
have the Court invalidate provincial legislation without having to do so directly.20 Many 
constitutional scholars point out a more evolved inter-government or federalism 
dimension of the reference question, namely that it serves as a “practical device [for 
governments] to police the constitutional excesses of the other”, while also noting its 
power to be used as a political weapon in inter-governmental sparring.21 The 1984 
Reference re Newfoundland Continental Shelf22 points to such an occasion. The federal 
government used their reference power to ask the Supreme Court about the 
constitutionality of off-shore natural resource exploration before the provincial court 
                                                 
16
 Reference re Agricultural Products Marketing, [1978] 2 SCR 1198; Reference re Newfoundland 
Continental Shelf, [1984] 1 SCR 86 
17
 AG BC v. AG Cda [1937] AC 377 III Olmsted 228; AG Cda v. AG Ontario [1937] AC 326. 
18
 Reference re Senate Reform, 2014 SCC 32; Reference re Supreme Court Act ss. 5 and 6, 2014 SCC 21, 
[2014] 1 SCR 433 
19 Reference, supra note 8 at para16. 
20
 Jennifer Smith, “The Origins of Judicial Review in Canada” (1983) 16 Canadian Journal of Political 
Science 1: 115–134. 
21
 Barry Strayer, “Constitutional References” in F. L. Morton, Law, politics, and the judicial process in 
Canada (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2002) at 262; Russell, supra note 7 at 7. 
22
 Reference re Newfoundland Continental Shelf [1984] 1 SCR 86. 
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could return their own answer. As the SCC ruled in favour of the government, the federal 
government effectively stemmed the provinces rights and upended the provincial court’s 
decision. 
Puddister, reviewing the political science literature, neatly categorizes the executive’s 
choice to submit a reference questions as stemming from one of five motivations: to 
avoid decision-making particularly in controversial policy areas (a delegation 
motivation), to protect jurisdiction (an inter-governmental conflict resolution function), to 
determine constitutionality of a policy (a proofing function), to benefit from institutional 
authority of the courts (a legitimation function), and to address pressing issues in a timely 
manner to allow for some amount of control in framing the policy debate (a strategic 
agenda-management function).23 These functions are corroborated in many analyses of 
individual reference cases24, some of which point to the volatility introduced into the 
system by reference questions. For example, Strayer notes that the executive’s relative 
freedom to be able to ask for advisory opinions threatens to erode the independence and 
authority of the courts.25 While others (including the Court itself) have taken the view 
that the Court’s ability to decline to answer certain questions protects it from such abuses, 
the potential for politicization of the advisory opinion remains one of its more 
controversial elements. 
Yet, reference decisions are neither a purely instrumental device to clarify the bounds of 
Canada’s political institutions, nor are they solely used to obtain advantages in inter-
governmental relations. Many reference decisions speak to a wide variety of 
constitutional matters that have profound implications for the lives of Canadians, ranging 
                                                 
23
 Puddister, supra note 6 at 14. 
24
 See Lori Hausegger, Troy Riddell, and Matthew Hennigar, Canadian Courts: Law, Politics, and 
Process, 2nd ed. (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2015); Carissima Mathen, “Mutability and Method 
in the Marriage Reference” (2005) 54 UNBLJ at 43; Kate Glover, “The Supreme Court in a Pluralistic 
World: Four Readings of a Reference” (2015) 60 McGill LJ 4 at: 839. 
25
 Strayer, supra note 21 at 262. 
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from their freedom to marry, to the status of their citizenship within the country.26 The 
advisory opinion has particular purchase in issues of constitutional reform and 
institutional change with fully one quarter of all final appellate court decisions involving 
constitutional law stemming from references.27 
While scholars point to the more strategic elements of the government’s ability to ask 
reference questions, the mechanism itself may also have more laudable uses. References 
can be used as an opportunity to test the legality of policy goals and initiatives.28 
Emergency conditions make it imperative that government can be assured of the validity 
of a proposed action.29 The Court may also be used to provide legal advice on a 
parliamentary issue that is largely non-justiciable. Advisory opinions can confirm 
jurisdiction, can bring levels of government together in deliberation and discussion 
outside of the usual forum of the First Ministers Meetings.30 The outcomes of advisory 
opinion may produce uniformity in standards across the country, as all governments will 
have had the benefit of hearing the Court’s deliberation on the issue. It may also have the 
benefit of preventing further litigation in areas of constitutional opaqueness.  
Certainly these advantages can largely be viewed as the other side of the strategic 
motivation coin. But it is also imperative to note that the federal government gives up 
some of its authority when deferring a question to the Court. Certainly, governments are 
able to frame questions as they wish; however, doing so always introduces an element of 
risk of having their position declined or ruled unconstitutional. Glover, for example, 
notes that once reference questions are submitted to the Court, governments lose control 
                                                 
26
 Re Same-Sex Marriage [2004] 3 SCR 698; Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217. 
27
 Strayer, supra note 21 at 261. 
28
 Glover, supra note 24. 
29
 Strayer, supra note 21 at 267. 
30
 When a reference is before the Court, all governments are notified and requests to serve as interveners 
are automatically accepted 
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over the process, arguments and outcome.31 As evident in the Harper government’s 
experiences with the Supreme Court Act Reference and Senate Reference, such gambles 
can have political consequences that may stymie or frustrate federal objectives. 
Regardless of the focus on the relative positives or negatives of the use of the reference 
question as a political tool, this executive-centred discourse has been the dominant 
narrative in explaining the use of the reference question. Far less has been said about the 
Court’s position in producing advisory opinions. I endeavour to fill that gap.  
2.1 A Singular Mechanism 
The Court has traditionally used the practice of delivering written decisions not only as a 
means to convey their ruling on a particular fact set, but also to communicate broader 
constitutional or legal principles to be applied by the legal community going forward. 
Most famously, in Edwards v Canada (AG), A.C. 124, 1929 UKPC 86, Justice Sankey’s 
communication of the “living tree capable of growth” principle that encourages courts to 
give the constitution a “large and liberal interpretation” has resonated with future Courts 
and been applied expeditiously in cases ranging from institutional reform to freedom of 
expression. This may be particularly true in their deliberation and delivery of decisions in 
advisory opinions precisely because these are opportunities for the Court to engage in 
conversation with the executive directly on issues of legal-political importance.   
While it is possible the Court does not see their role in references any differently than 
they view their role in routine litigation, the effect of their writings in response to 
reference questions may not only provide clarity on particular legal questions, it might 
also afford a legal audience a view of the Court’s broader understanding of an issue. Of 
course, this is not necessarily different than the clarity afforded through the Court’s 
regular jurisprudence; however, In short, the Court’s writings are a trove of information 
about the broader frameworks that they use to come to more particularized decisions.  
                                                 
31
 Kate Glover Berger, “The Impact of Constitutional References on Institutional Reform” in Emmett 
Macfarlane (ed), Policy Change, Courts, and the Canadian Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2018) at 126. 
  12 
The availability of these decisions is longstanding, but with an important caveat. Prior to 
1891, the SCC did not write up accompanying reasoning for the decisions it made with 
respect to reference questions. Amendments to the Supreme Court Act made in 1891 
allowed interested parties to submit oral and written arguments and have the Court hand 
down a written opinion.32 This change in procedure has yielded information, not only on 
outcomes, but process. Since provinces then gave themselves their own reference power 
through their appeal courts in the decade following the 1891 reforms, a tremendous 
volume of text is available to consider the opinions of courts as it relates to the provision 
of advisory opinions.  
These texts permit a number of forms of analysis. Most readily, observers of the Court’s 
decisions can glean from them a considerable amount of information with respect to their 
views on legal questions. As noted above, the Court has used the occasion of providing 
an advisory opinion to reflect on the nature of these opinions, their breadth and limits, as 
well as their utility with in the broader framework of Canadian jurisprudence. Yet, legal-
political and institutional conflict can also arise from advisory opinions as they may place 
limits on other branches or orders of government. In posing reference questions, the 
executive has challenged their legitimacy and legality more than once. In one decidedly 
meta-constitutional reference, the Re References by the Governor-General in Council, 
[1910] 43 S.C.R. 536, or the so-called “References Reference”33, the JCPC was asked to 
adjudicate whether the reference power of the executive was within the legislative 
jurisdiction of Parliament.34 Though it recognized that, in providing the advisory opinion, 
the Court was essentially engaging in an extrajudicial function (potentially compromising 
                                                 
32
 Strayer, supra note 21 at 261. 
33
 Reference, supra note 8. Interestingly, the JCPC ruled that, although answering references was a “non-
judicial function”, it could nonetheless be imposed on the court by statute. This reflects the prevailing 
notion at the time of the SCA, 1875 was merely statute, and not, as it is considered now, quasi-
constitutional legislation.  
34
 The question was framed as “whether under the Canadian Constitution the Governor-General in Council 
has power to frame and refer to the Supreme Court questions as to the constitutional powers of the 
Provinces as to the effect of Provincial statutes and as to the interests of individuals who may be 
unrepresented upon such reference and to require the Supreme Court to answer such questions.” Reference, 
supra note 8 at 2. 
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its independence), it clarified that it was permitted to do so because the opinions are 
solely advisory and not legally binding.35 The Court was called upon for this sort of self-
reflection again in the Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court 
(P.E.I.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, wherein the Court was, in effect, asked to comment on its 
own independence as well as core functions of the judiciary.36 Similarly, in the Senate 
Reform Reference, the Court further outlined its “proper role”, that of determining “the 
legal framework for implementing the specific changes”, rather than the desirability of 
such changes.37 The Court’s ruling in the Supreme Court Act Reference is another clear 
example of the Court weighing in on its own independence and status within the 
constitutional order. 
The executive has pushed back on the legitimacy of the advisory opinion in further 
cases.38 In the Reference re Canada Assistant Plan (BC) [1991] 2 SCR 525, the Court 
asserted limits around the requirement to answer reference questions, stating that it could 
decline to answer a reference question where it would take the court beyond “its proper 
role within the constitutional framework of our democratic form of government”.39 In the 
Secession Reference40, the Court revisited this issue and addressed the critique that the 
advisory opinion fell outside routine judicial function41. In their decision, the Court 
                                                 
35
 Advisory opinions, though not binding, are cited in case law as would any other legal precedent. Thus, 
they take on, in many ways, the characteristics of binding decisions. Strayer, supra note 21 at 261 notes that 
they are “Technically not binding, but still authoritative”. 
36
 Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism Or Democratic Dialogue  (Toronto: Irwin 
Law, 2016) at 157. 
37
 Reference, supra note 18 at para 4. 
38
 However, looking at the disposition of the Court in reference cases, Puddister, supra note 6, finds that 
only in 21% of cases was government law invalidated (Invalid in part 16%; Valid 46%; N/A 17%). 
39
 Florian Sauvageau, David Schneiderman, and David Taras, Last Word: Media Coverage of the Supreme 
Court of Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2011) at 125; Reference re Canada 
Assistant Plan (BC) [1991] 2 SCR 525 at 545.  
40
 Reference, supra note 26. 
41
 The Amicus Curiae for Quebec questioned the function of the Court’s advisory power as follows: 
“[e]ither this constitutional power [to give the highest court in the federation jurisdiction to give advisory 
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clearly articulated that, while the reference power might not be expressly enumerated 
within either of Canada’s constitutions, “there is no constitutional bar to this Court's 
receipt of jurisdiction to undertake such an advisory role”.42 They also used the 
opportunity to clarify that it would not be compelled to answer questions put to it by 
government that were “outside the court’s expertise, the interpretation of the law, broadly 
construed”.43 In essence, the Court has been able to use the very mechanism that contains 
an attack in its own defence – suggesting that the advisory opinion is truly a unique 
political tool. 
The Court has also used the advisory opinion to provide clarity on legal matters that had 
not been (or could not be) brought to the Court through tradition litigation. For example, 
in the Patriation Reference, the Court made a statement about the use of conventions and 
remedy for their violation. In looking at the justiciability dimension of the convention 
question, which, though not a matter of law according to justices Estey, Laskin and 
McIntyre, one that they would take up owing to in the Patriation Reference because of the 
“unusual nature of these References”.44 This comment clearly reflects the fact that 
advisory opinions, while part of the broader set of case law, hold a special place in this 
body precisely because they are a type of executive-judicial engagement that permits a 
wider set of legal issues to be adjudicated. The practical outcome is that the Court’s 
decision elevated conventions from a mere political nicety to a quasi-justiciable element 
within constitutional law. 
Similarly, the Court has used the mechanism of advisory opinions to make statements 
writ large on the nature of constitutional law in Canada with profound effects for political 
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actors and institutions. Glover notes that in the Senate Reference, the Court used theories 
of unwritten constitutional law and precedent to conclude that the constitution has an 
internal architecture (upholding and expanding upon their statement in OPSEU45), 
thereby limiting the legislature’s unilateral ability to tinker with institutional structure.46 
From a theoretical perspective, the decision filled many textual gaps in constitutional law 
that were exposed in the writing of the 1982 Constitution Act47. However, from a 
practical perspective, the Court used the reference decision to reinforce norms about 
inter-governmental relations set out in early decisions.48  
In all of the above decisions, the Court has used the process of deliberation and creation 
of a written advisory opinion to make a series of (largely) inter-connected statements 
about constitutional law with profound effects for the practice of politics in Canada. As 
noted by Mathen, in each decision, “the Court appears to be performing the same 
function: identifying broad principles and applying them to produce a particular legal 
rule”.49 Of course, the Court does not have to wait for a reference question to be asked to 
make such declarations (they could do so in routine case law), but the advisory opinion 
offers the Court a few opportunities that are unique to the mechanism: (1) to respond to 
constitutional questions more broadly than is usually done in routine litigation; (2) to 
directly engage with the executive on matters of legal-political importance; (3) to 
selectively answer questions (and in doing so, make implicit statements about the 
appropriateness of the tool’s use or the question at hand)50; and, (4) to expand on the 
scope of questions asked with far-ranging implications for core elements of the Canadian 
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political structure. This singular mechanism provides ample scope for the study of not 
only constitutional law, but also judicial behaviour. It is to this issue that I now turn.  
 
2.2 A Framework for Advice: Assessing Judges’ Role in 
Advisory Decisions 
Across the aforementioned decisions and the myriad other reference questions that have 
been asked of the Court, we can see preliminary evidence of the Court commenting on its 
role in the advisory capacity and setting out norms for judicial behaviour. For example, in 
the Secession Reference, the Court asserts, “The very fact that the Court may be asked 
hypothetical questions in a reference, such as the constitutionality of proposed legislation, 
engages the Court in an exercise it would never entertain in the context of litigation”.51 In 
doing so, the courts puts limitations around how far its advisory capacity goes and 
suggests that the prevailing norm of judicial behaviour, in the aggregate, is to impose 
self-restraint in its position of constitutional advisor. There are a number of implications 
that arise from this statement. First, the courts tend not to comment on matters that are 
currently under review by the courts or in another jurisdiction. To do so would be to 
interfere with a lower court’s jurisdiction or would jeopardize ongoing hearings. Second, 
broader comments on constitutionality, as related to the legal framework or constitutional 
architecture are well within the courts’ purview and the courts may address some of these 
in an opinion even if it is not within the narrow question asked by the Governor-in-
Council. The Court’s pronouncement on constitutional architecture embedded in the 
Senate Reference might be an example of this. Third, advisory opinions are (presumably) 
part of a broader dialogue between the executive and the judiciary. Though the legislature 
rarely does pose a question to the Court, they are permitted to do so under section 54 of 
the Supreme Court Act (1875), and they are certainly implicated in the outcomes of 
advisory opinions in their legislative work. A fourth mechanism may also be at play in 
the mechanical structure of the advisory opinion. That the federal government has the 
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agenda setting power to ask questions of the Court, and provincial governments of their 
Courts of Appeal, suggests that reference questions can also be used in opposition to one 
another as an instrument of intergovernmental relations. In sum, there are at least four 
mechanisms at play here: (1) protecting the rule of law; (2) addressing questions of 
constitutionality; (3) institutional relations; and (4) “umpiring” federalism.52 
Though the presumed implication of an advisory opinion is largely a legal matter, 
reference questions and the advisory opinions that are rendered in response are not 
immune from political influence. As noted above, the questions themselves may have 
political or strategic value. Thus, this research endeavour focuses on the narratives that 
the Court creates and how these have evolved over time. As Glover notes, externally 
applied narratives have surrounded the Court since its inception.53 These include the 
“evolving Court”, which grew from a secondary court to the highest judicial body in the 
land with elevated power post-Charter, as well as the Court as a powerful actor/check on 
government/sometimes-policymaker.54 Such narratives socially construct a role for the 
Court from the outside. However, the Court goes a long way to contribute to the 
narratives through the discourses about constitutional law, political institutions and 
federalism that it creates inside of its own decisions.  
The above examination of the political and legal dimensions of the advisory opinion 
points to a testable proposition about the presence of and relative weight of internally-
constructed narratives emanating from the Court’s advisory opinions. The observations 
above suggest four way(s) in which the Court may narrate its role vis-à-vis reference 
questions: 
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(1) In issuing advisory opinions, the Supreme Court contributes to a narrative of 
deference to the authority of the executive in law/policymaking matters (the 
Institutional role); 
(2) In issuing advisory opinions, the Supreme Court contributes to a narrative of 
limiting the authority of the executive to act unilaterally, instead promoting some 
conception of what the public wants or the current temperature of society (broadly 
speaking) on a particular social issue (the Public Will role); 
(3) In issuing advisory opinions, the Supreme Court contributes to a narrative of 
itself as the protector of constitutional architecture (the Guardian of the 
Constitution role 55); 
(4) In issuing advisory opinions, the Supreme Court contributes to a narrative of 
itself as an arbiter of intergovernmental relations (the Umpire of Federalism role). 
Of course, these four narratives may be interdependent and could be at play in varying 
combinations to varying degrees, depending on the question(s) at hand. As Glover notes, 
these metaphors are relational – they suggest the nature of relationships between actors.56 
It may also be the case that some advisory opinions contain none of these narratives. 
However, understanding the presence and volume of these narratives and how the Court 
has applied them over time (particularly before and after critical junctures such as the 
introduction of the Charter) provide legal scholars a basis upon which they can build 
over-time analyses of the Court’s behaviours with respect to constitutional law and 
judicial-executive relations. The importance of understanding the decision-making 
processes that courts undertake when responding to a reference question is central to 
understanding legal and political processes (i.e. how government works), and the legality 
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of political outcomes that have implications for the relationships between governments, 
constitutional architecture and public policy matters.  
On the process side, the advisory opinion is a clear example of the tensions that exist 
within intergovernmental relationships. It reflects the necessary connection between the 
branches of government – in this case the judiciary and an executive whose power 
emanated from its position within the legislative branch. In this sense, the significance of 
asking how judges view their role is directly connected to the extent of their authority in 
providing legal advice to the executive branch. This rather benign statement carries with 
it considerable implications for the way that legal scholars have traditionally understood 
the bounds of the judiciary’s authority. Legal scholarship has demonstrated a wide 
variety of opinions as to how much the courts should weigh in on matters of public policy 
that, according to a strict constitutional interpretation, ought to fall solely within the 
legislative purview of the legislature and executive.57  
This may prompt the question of whether the provision of advisory opinions constitutes 
one of the Court’s essential features. As defined in the Supreme Court Act Reference 
(2015), the essential features of the Court, which are protected from simple statutory 
change under s. 42(1)(d), include the Court’s composition, its jurisdiction as the final 
court of appeal on matters of constitutional interpretation (and other legal matters) and its 
independence from government. Although the decision notes that the entirety of the 
Supreme Court Act is not necessarily covered by the protections to its framework 
governed by Part V of the Constitution Act of 198258, it is possible that, by reflecting on 
the Court’s adjudication of its role in the context of the reference opinions, we may find 
evidence that it is plausibly protected as such.  
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The burden has repeatedly fallen to the courts to adjudicate such matters. While those 
committed to a firm line between the courts and the legislature in terms of policymaking 
might argue that the courts should not accept reference questions to prevent them from 
having to engage in matters beyond the scope of their judicial duties, a critic might point 
to the legislative point of origin (the SCA) which has subsequently taken on constitutional 
status. Therefore, understanding the courts’ view on the scope of their duties in hearing 
debates and issuing advisory opinions is necessary to understanding how the court sees 
the scope of its power, and how, if at all, this has changed over time. 
Finally, this question also further engages with the literature on judicial behaviour.59 
Judges are perceived to be rational actors, and even though their positions call for 
independence from the political process, a lifetime of judicial decisions often renders 
evident certain views of how political processes ought to be or how the law ought to 
function. This implicitly normative element, even when suppressed by a textualist read of 
law or the constitution, highlights that judges, like everyone else, have political and 
ideological views that underscore their decision-making. Part of this concern, and others 
listed above, is dealt with in the references themselves. The 1910 reference Re 
References60, adjudicated by the JCPC, states that references are not a threat to the 
separation of the powers between the legislative, executive and judicial branches of 
government. It also gave further discretion to the courts to decide appropriate use of the 
reference power by the executive, thereby implying that (to some extent, at least), just as 
the Court has control of its docket, so does it have control over what reference cases it 
hears.61  
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Chapter 2  
Methodology 
At first glance, it may be logical to think that the problem above is a relatively 
straightforward question that could best be solved by carefully interrogating the texts of 
the advisory opinions and inferring based on the results. Yet, such an approach would 
necessarily leave out the many policy implications or strategic considerations by other 
relevant actors (namely, the federal government and governments in other jurisdictions, 
as well as the legal and (often) corporate communities that are the subjects of these 
references). If we are to acknowledge that agency is relevant in this discussion, then 
examples of attitudinal models of judicial behaviour are relevant here.62 It would also be 
sensible to acknowledge the potential for the Court’s role to shift over time, thus 
prompting an inherent temporal comparative element to the research at hand. Thus, the 
question evokes elements of doctrinal, empirical and comparative methodological 
approaches, each offering a different way to triangulate the Courts’ view of their role.  
We may think of this question as lending itself quite nicely to a mixed methods approach. 
While mixed methods approaches are not mainstream within legal analysis at present, 
their adoption in other fields within the social and behavioural sciences suggests they 
might have purchase in the analysis of legal questions as well. Mixed methods emerge 
from a positivist tradition and seek to employ a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative methodological techniques to better triangulate outcomes of interest.63 
Similarly, multi-method approaches use multiple methodological techniques within the 
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same quantitative or qualitative tradition.64 The advantage of mixed- or multi-method 
designs (and methodological pluralism in general) is not only that it permits a more 
robust assessment of a research question, but also in its ability to bridge methodological 
divides between researchers, promoting greater acceptance of scholarship across sub-
disciplines. 
To answer the questions I have set out above, I will provide a summary analysis of all 
reference cases across the two time periods of interest. The summary analysis will 
include differentiation of the cases using broad empirical indicators such as structure of 
the decision (unanimous, number of opinions/dissents) and presence or absence (and 
degree) of any of the relevant conceptions of the SCC’s role. This empirical analysis will 
also include the results of an in-depth manual coding exercise where the text of the 
opinions is coded for the presence of the four narratives on a per-sentence basis to permit 
some broader observations to be drawn from the larger corpus of text under investigation 
(see below for further information). The second part of the analysis will be more 
qualitatively focused and feature a case study of four decisions (two from the Laskin 
Court and two from the McLachlin Court) that typify some of the patterns observed in the 
quantitative analysis. Although the selection of four cases will necessarily exclude some 
of the empirical richness that can be observed in the other available cases, they will be 
presented in a manner that reflects upon which trends are representative of the court’s 
broader stance on the issues at the time and which are unique to the case study under 
observation.  
Thus, I take a mixed-methodological approach that integrates three different positivist 
epistemological approaches: a doctrinal approach, an empirical approach and a cross-case 
comparative approach. Each is discussed briefly below. 
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3.1 Doctrinal Approach  
First, I used a case-driven method – doctrinal analysis of the advisory opinions 
themselves. Where possible, I supplement this analysis with secondary sources. The 
doctrinal method, as noted by Morris and Murphy focuses “almost entirely on the law’s 
own language of statutes and case law to make sense of the legal world”.65 In other 
words, it does not concern itself with the policy implications (except to the extent that 
policy is related to the analysis of the law) of the reference questions (though this is a 
useful, if separate, area for further analysis). Doctrinal analysis does, however, enable a 
study of the principles of the law that undergird the inclusions of the reference decision 
as a mechanism for constitutional clarification in the Supreme Court Act (1875). Thus, 
statutory interpretation plays an integral role in this study. In analysing the intentions set 
out by the framers of the Act and comparing those with the contents of the reference 
cases, I can investigate how the Court’s role has evolved with respect to how it addresses 
advisory opinions and what the original intent of the Act suggests it ought to have been.66 
This deductive doctrinal analysis provides the contextual reading required to make 
assertions about what the scope of the court’s role according to legislation baseline for 
measuring what it has become over time. 
3.2 Empirical Approach 
Second, I take an empirical approach in examining the content of the reference cases 
using a content analytical method. A considerable effort has been devoted to attitudinal or 
behavioural studies of judicial behaviour that look at judicial decisions and infer judges’ 
motivations from their writings.67 Indeed, this is both a useful and practical 
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methodological exercise as the judges declare openly their process of deliberation and 
their reasoning for coming to the decision. From a practical perspective, the public 
availability of these often-lengthy decisions provides scholars with ample material to 
study using a content analysis approach. Such approaches are not often used, but are also 
not completely novel in legal research. Work by Slotnick and Sauvageau, Schneiderman 
and Taras illustrate the utility of content analysis approaches in looking at media 
coverage of the US and Canadian Supreme Court.68 More broadly, Krippendorf 
recognizes the utility of applying content analysis across all areas of the humanities and 
social science, as they permit systematic analysis of text for both manifest (i.e. surface-
level) and latent (i.e. meaning intensive) content.69  
This portion takes on both an inductive and deductive element. The deductive approach is 
evident in the process of setting out a series of indicators that are reflective of the 
concepts specified in my hypothesis. The inductive element is reflective of the fact that 
the coding process is somewhat iterative. While the coding process may be automated, 
the process of manual verification of the application of the coding permits the researcher 
to continuously refine the coding to enhance validity and reliability of the measures. 
These objective-style70 indicators are then used to code the cases for the presence or 
absence of my four motivations interest. One the coding is complete, I apply the analysis 
comparatively across the two Chief Justice’s Courts by analyzing the frequencies of my 
four hypothesized expectations. A coding framework and elaboration on the technique 
can be found in Appendix B. 
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3.3 Comparative Approach 
Finally, the added element of the Laskin/McLachlin Court comparison necessitates a 
comparative research design. Unlike traditional cross-national comparisons, this study 
takes on a within-case comparison across time.71 This sort of within-case study stems 
some of the critiques often levelled at comparative work – namely, that it does not allow 
in-depth analysis of the legal contexts across comparators. Within-case analysis, such as 
that of Judith Resnick on the comparison across three US Supreme Court Chief Justices 
provides a useful model for examining the institutional and jurisprudential developments 
that occur under different judicial leadership.72 Of course, the over-time analysis adds a 
historical dimension to the paper; however, I am cautious about characterising this 
analysis as historical in terms of its methodology. While the analysis recognizes the 
implicit historical dimension and context under which each Court laboured, it does not 
specifically treat historical era as an independent variable that could affect outcome.  
This tri-partite method is well suited to answer the overarching research question as it 
robustly addresses three different areas of analysis for the question. It takes on the careful 
legal text-based analysis through the doctrinal aspect. It provides an analytical approach 
through the collection and analysis of quantitative data. And finally, it recognized the 
implicit dimension of change and continuity that exists across courts by comparing two 
different time periods – particularly one that represents a potential pivot point in the way 
the court addresses issues of constitutional importance through references. 
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Chapter 3  
Results 
An examination of the secondary literature in this area suggests that we should expect 
some degree of adhesion to each of the five hypotheses set out above. Indeed, work by 
Mathen73, Puddister74, and Glover75 has suggested that the reference power is not only a 
useful tool for the executive to escape the pressures of some of the more controversial 
questions, but it also represents a venue for the courts to engage in the protection of 
constitution, the maintenance of the federal system and the delineation of the executive’s 
policymaking boundaries, and their ability to wade into contemporary social-political 
issues. The following analysis determines to what degree each of these themes or 
narratives (these terms are used interchangeably) exist in the two sets of advisory 
opinions. 
The results section proceeds as follows: I begin with some general observations about the 
structure of the advisory opinion cases across the Laskin and McLachlin eras. This 
includes some cursory observations about the origin of the cases, the structure of the 
response from the Court (i.e. per curiam, unanimous, split decisions, etc.), the subject 
matter of the cases and the general thematic disposition or narrative contained in the 
decision. Following these observations, I engage in a comparative analysis of the 
dominant trends of the Laskin Court and the McLachlin Court. Given the quantitative, 
tabular thrust of this analysis, it is necessarily based on objective indicators (e.g. how 
many mentions of a particular narrative are in a given case?), rather than in-depth 
analysis of any one theme or case. However, this aggregate analysis alone may lack the 
descriptive richness of case-based study as is found in analyses of specific references.76 
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Therefore, after concluding the empirical section of the comparative analysis, I engage in 
a qualitative analysis of four cases that typify the dominant narratives discussed in the 
earlier portion of this study. This portion of the analysis allows me to draw out some of 
the themes in greater depth than is permitted by the empirical analysis alone. 
 
4.1 Advisory Opinions in Two Eras: Structure and Trends 
Beginning with some cursory observations about the nature of the advisory opinions in 
the Laskin era (1973-1984) and the McLachlin era (2000-2017), one immediately notes 
that Laskin served as a Chief Justice for a comparatively “short” 11 years, compared with 
McLachlin’s 18. Yet, the length of the eras appears to have no discernible impact on the 
trends of how many or what type of reference questions was asked of the Courts. Each 
Court’s decisions, their origins, the structure of the Court’s response, case type and 
dominant theme or characteristic are catalogued in Tables 1 and 2. The Laskin Court 
provided a total of 13 advisory opinions. Three of these were questions asked directly by 
the Governor-in-Council, while the remaining 10 were cases on appeal from the 
provinces (2 from Ontario, 2 from Newfoundland, 2 from Alberta, 1 from New 
Brunswick, 1 from British Columbia, 1 from Quebec and 1 – the Resolution to Amend the 
Constitution Reference – from Manitoba, Newfoundland and Quebec). Four decisions 
were issued per curiam, a much higher proportion of per curiam decisions then rendered 
by the Laskin Court during the equivalent time.77 An additional three decisions were 
unanimous, suggesting a high level (7 out of 13 or 54%) of agreement among the Court 
on advisory issues. Of the remaining split decisions, only two – the Patriation Reference 
and the Ownership of the Bed of the Strait of Georgia and Related Areas Reference had 
multiple dissents.78  
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Table 1 Advisory Opinions (Laskin Court) 
Case Origin Structure Case Type Dominant 
Characteristic 
Re Anti Inflation 
Act 
Reference 
by 
Governor-
in-Council 
Majority, 
concurrence, 
dissent 
(Beetz, 
Grandpré) 
Constitutional Institutional 
Re Agricultural 
Products 
Marketing 
On appeal 
from ON 
Court of 
Appeal 
Majority 
with 
unwritten 
dissent79 
(Spence and 
Dickson) 
Constitutional; 
Resource 
Federalism 
Re Authority of 
Parliament in 
relation to the 
Upper House 
Reference 
by 
Governor-
in-Council 
Per curium Constitutional Guardian of 
the 
Constitution  
Re Residential 
Tenancies Act, 
1979 
Provincial 
appeal from 
ON Court of 
Appeal 
Unanimous Constitutional Guardian of 
the 
Constitution 
Re Resolution to 
amend the 
Constitution 
On appeal 
from MB, 
NF and QC 
Courts of 
Appeal 
Majority 
with two 
dissents 
(Martland 
and Ritchie) 
(Laskin, 
Estey, 
McIntyre) 
Constitutional Guardian of 
the 
Constitution 
Re Newfoundland 
and Labrador 
Corporation Ltd. 
et al. v. Attorney 
General of 
Newfoundland 
Provincial 
appeal from 
NF Court of 
Appeal 
Unanimous Constitutional; 
Resource 
N/A 
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Re Objection by 
Quebec to a 
Resolution to 
amend the 
Constitution 
On appeal 
from QC 
Court of 
Appeal 
Per Curium Constitutional Guardian of 
the 
Constitution  
Re Exported 
Natural Gas Tax 
Provincial 
appeal from 
AB Court of 
Appeal 
Majority 
with one 
dissent 
(Laskin, 
McIntyre, 
Lamer) 
Constitutional; 
Resource 
Guardian of 
the 
Constitution  
Re McEvoy v. 
Attorney General 
for New 
Brunswick et al. 
On appeal 
from NB 
Court of 
Appeal 
Per curium Constitutional; 
Criminal 
Guardian of 
the 
Constitution  
Re Newfoundland 
Continental Shelf 
Reference 
from 
Governor In 
Council 
Per curium  Constitutional; 
Resource 
Guardian of 
the 
Constitution 
Upper Churchill 
Water Rights 
Reversion Act 
On appeal 
from NF 
Court of 
Appeal 
Unanimous Constitutional; 
Resource 
Federalism 
Ownership of the 
Bed of the Strait 
of Georgia and 
Related Areas 
On appeal 
from BC 
Court of 
Appeal 
Majority 
with two 
dissents 
(Ritchie) 
(Wilson) 
Constitutional; 
Resource 
Guardian of 
the 
Constitution 
(Negligible) 
Wiretap 
Reference 
On appeal 
from AB 
Court of 
Appeal 
Majority 
with one 
dissent 
(Dickson and 
Chouinard) 
Criminal Public Will 
(Negligible) 
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Table 2 Advisory Opinions (McLachlin Court) 
Case Origin Structure Case Type Dominant 
Characteristic 
Re Firearms Act 
(Can) 
Provincial 
appeal from 
AB 
Per Curium Constitutional Guardian of 
the 
Constitution 
Re Same Sex 
Marriage 
Reference 
by 
Governor-
in-Council 
Per Curium Constitutional; 
Civil 
Guardian of 
the 
Constitution 
Re Employment 
Insurance Act 
(Can) ss. 22 and 
23 
On appeal 
from QC 
Court of 
Appeal 
Unanimous Constitutional Public Will 
Re Assisted 
Human 
Reproduction 
Act 
On appeal 
from QC 
Court of 
Appeal 
Plurality, 
plurality, one 
dissent 
(Cromwell) 
Constitutional; 
Criminal 
Guardian of 
the 
Constitution, 
Federalism 
 
Re Broome v PEI On appeal 
from PEI 
Court of 
Appeal 
Unanimous Tort N/A 
Re Securities Act Reference 
by 
Governor-
in-Council 
Per Curium Constitutional Federalism, 
Guardian of 
the 
Constitution 
Re Senate 
Reform 
Reference 
by 
Governor-
in-Council 
Per Curium Constitutional Guardian of 
the 
Constitution 
 
Re Supreme 
Court Act, ss. 5 
and 6 
Reference 
by 
Governor-
in-Council 
Majority, one 
dissent 
(Moldaver) 
Constitutional Federalism, 
Guardian of 
the 
Constitution 
The subject matter of the reference cases is also of great interest. While all 13 were noted 
to address questions of constitutional law in the case summary provided by the Court, 
almost half (N=6) were cases that dealt with some aspect of natural resource distribution 
or ownership. These decisions, including cases on access to resource deposits, water 
rights and agricultural products, appeared to consume the Court’s reference docket from 
the 1970s to the early 1980s. Of course, this is commensurate with the debate over and 
ultimate institution of section 92A, which altered the balance of natural resource rights to 
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favour the provinces, in the Constitution Act, 1867. Two further cases dealt with 
constitutional law as they relate to criminal matters. Yet, in summary, the Court, in this 
era, exclusively dealt with constitutional matters in their advisory opinions. 
The McLachlin Court, by contrast, provided only 8 advisory opinions, half of which were 
questions asked directly by the Governor-in-Council. Of the remaining 4 cases, 2 cases 
were on appeal from Quebec, one from Alberta and one from PEI. Again, four decisions 
were issued per curiam and an additional two decisions were unanimous. It is possible 
that a high rate on unanimity reflects the need to appear to be in consensus, particularly in 
higher profile reference cases, particularly since the overall rate in unanimous and per 
curiam decisions is higher in this subset of cases than it is in the Court’s unanimity rate 
from 1949 to 2017 (56%).80 Similar to the Laskin Court, the McLachlin Court showed a 
high level of agreement in reference cases with only two divided decisions: one 
containing two plurality decisions and one a majority with a lone dissent (the Assisted 
Human Reproduction Act Reference). Almost all cases revolved around constitutional 
questions with one (the Same Sex Marriage Reference having a strong civil dimension), 
one (the Assisted Human Reproduction Act Reference) having a criminal aspect, and the 
lone non-constitutional case (Broome v PEI) dealing with a tort matter.81 
Turning to the question of which narratives were dominant in these reference decisions, 
we can observe two notable trends embedded in the written decisions of each Court. To 
explore the dominant themes of the case, I summed the number of thematic codes (see 
Appendix B for the detailed coding guide) across each case. Tables 1 and 2 feature each 
case, listed with its dominant theme and a secondary theme, if appropriate. Where use of 
any of the themes was scant, the presence of the theme is noted as being “negligible”. 
Tables 3 and 4 clarify the relative “strength” of that theme by observing the number of 
                                                 
80
 Puddister, supra note 6 at 104 
81
 Note that two decisions, the Newfoundland and Labrador Corporation Ltd. et al. v. Attorney General of 
Newfoundland Reference and Broome v PEI do not factor into the analysis here as the subject matter of the 
reference was exclusively related to provincial content and did not, in the same manner of the other 
advisory opinions, give the Court the same opportunity to engage in any of the listed narratives. Though 
they are included in tables for posterity sake, they are otherwise omitted from the analysis.  
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sentences coded as belonging to one or more themes. It is first useful to note that overall 
numbers of thematic cues are low (ranging from none to 43). Given the considerable 
length of these documents, it may initially appear that an obvious finding is that the Court 
quite simply does not engage in as much narrative cueing as the literature might suggest. 
However, this is likely a product of the amount of space the Court dedicates to material 
that is not coded in this exercise (see Appendix B), such as the text of decisions, 
repetition of legislative sections, and so forth. Additionally, while only specific sentences 
that cue a specific theme were coded as such, it is often the case that the surrounding text 
reinforces a consistent theme even if the text itself does not explicitly cue the theme. In 
this sense, the results reported here may be conservative, but they are likely more 
nuanced than they might have been had wider swaths of text been coded simply because 
they accompany a thematic cue.  
Not all cases presented strong elements of the four narratives. In some, such as 
Newfoundland and Labrador Corporation Ltd. et al. v. Attorney General of 
Newfoundland [1982] (Laskin) and Broome v. Prince Edward Island [2010] (McLachlin), 
the Court made no mention of any of the four narratives. In two others, Ownership of the 
Bed of the Strait of Georgia and Related Areas [1984] and the Wiretap Reference [1984], 
there was only scant mention of one theme. Of course, as suggested in the methodology 
section, it is not necessary that the Court would conform to any of these narratives, 
therefore the absence of such thematic cues is a reflection of the wide variety of roles 
played by the Court and the fact that other thematic elements (not expanded upon here) 
may play into the Court’s presentation of the law.  
Turning, however, to those cases that did feature one or more of the four outline 
narratives illustrates that these four hypothesized themes are, indeed, present in the 
Courts’ reasoning of a vast array of legal subject matter. Starting with the Laskin Court, 
Figure 1 gives us an overview of the distribution of thematic cues (all cases aggregated). 
Almost 60% of all coded statements were in relation to the Guardian of the Constitution 
theme. A further 30% were coded as representing the Federalism theme, leaving only 
10% coded as Institutional and less than 1% coded as Public Will. These initial findings 
promote several useful observations: first, it is clear that the Laskin Court articulates its 
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decisions predominantly according to the two most common themes associated with the 
Court – their role in adjudicating the constitutional order and maintaining the workings of 
federalism. Second, the overwhelming emphasis on constitutional questions, as opposed 
to federalism, may reflect the pending constitutional renegotiations, but also the relative 
cooperative era in federalism that predated the comparatively raucous inter-governmental 
affairs of the early 1980s. Finally, the lack of Public Will narrative statements suggests, 
as we might expect, that the Court, pre-Charter, did not see itself as an instrument of the 
public interest and instead, reflected more traditional notions of the Court as an arbiter of 
governmental issues.  
Figure 1 Thematic Distribution (Laskin Court) 
 
  
10.10%
0.50%
59.60%
29.80%
Distribution of Themes (Laskin Court)
Institutional
Public Will
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Federalism
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Figure 2 Thematic Distribution (McLachlin Court) 
 
Breaking this analysis down by case (see Tables 3 and 4) reveals the considerable amount 
of variation in the application of these narratives. The 10% of Institutional cues come 
primary from the Reference re Anti-Inflation Act where the Court appeared to take the 
part of the federal executive in protecting their agenda (see below for an expansion of this 
analysis). We see similar, though less pronounced tendencies in the Agricultural 
Products Marketing Reference, the Residential Tenancies Act Reference and the 
Patriation Reference. As the Institutional frame is representative of a more protective 
stance of the federal government, anticipated to be the leading government, it is perhaps 
one that we might expect to see less from a judicial body that values its independence 
from the executive. It differentiates itself from the Guardian or Federalism narrative 
because it is an example of the (rare) instance wherein the Court appears to defer to the 
executive’s agenda rather than simply delineating federal-provincial boundaries from a 
constitutional or (relatedly) jurisdictional control. 
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Table 3 Thematic Distributions by Case (Laskin Court) 
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Anti-Inflation Act [1976] 10  4 5 
Agricultural Products Marketing [1978] (Egg 
Reference II) 
4  3 11 
Authority of Parliament in Relation to the Upper 
House [1980] 
  7 2 
Residential Tenancies Act [1981]  2  6 4 
Resolution to Amend the Constitution [1981] 3  43 19 
Newfoundland and Labrador Corporation Ltd. et al. 
v. Attorney General of Newfoundland [1982] 
    
Constitution of Canada [1982]   9 5 
Exported Natural Gas and Gas Liquids Tax [1982]   25 5 
McEvoy v. Attorney General (NB) Court of Unified 
Criminal Jurisdiction [1983] 
  7 1 
Newfoundland Continental Shelf [1984]   5 1 
Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act [1984]   2 3 
Ownership of the Bed of the Strait of Georgia and 
Related Areas [1984] 
  1  
The Wiretap Reference [1984]   1   
Total Percentage of all Codes 10% .5% 59.5% 30% 
*Modal Theme in Bold 
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Table 4 Thematic Distributions by Case (McLachlin Court) 
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Firearms Act (Can) [2000]    6 1 
Same Sex Marriage [2004]  1 2 3 1 
Employment Insurance Act (Can) ss22 and 23 [2005]   13 7 2 
Assisted Human Reproduction Act [2010] 1  16 10 
Broome v. Prince Edward Island [2010]     
Securities Act [2011]  1 28 40 
Senate Reform [2014]   34 2 
Supreme Court Act, ss 5 and 6 (Nadon) [2014] 8 2 13 18 
Total Percentage of all Codes 5% 9% 51% 35% 
*Modal Theme in Bold 
The Federalism narrative has a stronger presence than its Institutional counterpart in the 
Laskin era, but not nearly as strong as that of the Guardian of the Constitution narrative. 
The Federalism narrative is predominant in only one case (the Agricultural Products 
Marketing Reference), where it receives 4 mentions. It is the primary narrative in one 
other (The Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act Reference) (N=3), but narrative 
content in that reference is both close in number to that of the Guardian narrative (N=2) 
and decidedly low overall, therefore, the finding is less compelling. The majority of 
advisory opinions provided by the Laskin Court fall into the category of majority 
Guardian narratives. Two in particular, the Patriation Reference and the Exported 
Natural Gas Reference have strong Guardian narrative elements, the former with a 
complementary Federalism narrative component as well. That the former case – one that 
specifically deals with the subject matter of amending the Constitution – has a strong 
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Guardian narrative is not at all surprising and, indeed, very much in line with extant 
research on the subject.82 However, the latter is of interest. As of one of six references in 
this era that focus on resource-related questions (four of which are also categorized as 
Guardian narratives83), the preponderance of Guardian narrative cues in this particular 
reference is notable. The decision is the first of five references that deal with the 
distribution of resource wealth or opportunities between the two levels of government 
and, as such, set the tone for the Court’s response to resource issues, particularly in a time 
of evolving jurisdictional questions with the adoption of section 92A in 1982.  
Turning to the McLachlin Court’s use of narrative elements, Figure 2 displays the 
narrative distribution from 2000 to 2017. Notably, the general trend found in the Laskin 
data holds for the McLachlin Court. The Guardian of the Constitution narrative is the 
dominant narrative (51%), followed by the Federalism narrative (35%). Interestingly, the 
relative frequency of the Institutional and Public Will narratives remains low overall, but 
their individual prominence is reversed. Also relevant is the subtle loss of dominance of 
the Guardian narrative and the relative increase in the use of the Federalism narrative.  
Looking to the individual cases, we have no clear examples of a dominant Institutional 
narrative with only three cases making use of this narrative in any capacity. By contrast, 
we see one clear example of the Public Will narrative take hold (in the Employment 
Insurance Act Reference). Contrary to what one might expect, there is a lack of Public 
Will thematic cues in the Same-Sex Marriage Reference. Given the societal shift of the 
time toward public acceptance and approval of same-sex marriage, the Court appeared 
reluctant to explicitly use the language of the will of public in its reasoning. As might be 
expected, the same two narratives (Guardian and Federalism) that drove the reasoning in 
the Laskin era are prominent again, but this time in greater balance with one another. As 
evident in Table 4, two cases have a clear majority Federalism narrative (the Securities 
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 See Mathen, supra note 9.  
83
 The fifth – the Newfoundland and Labrador Corporation Ltd. et al. v. Attorney General of 
Newfoundland Reference – is excluded as it did not posses any relevant narrative cues. 
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Act Reference and the Supreme Court Act Reference), while the Guardian narrative is 
predominant in the Senate Reform Reference and the Assisted Human Reproduction Act 
Reference. To a lesser extent, the Same Sex Marriage Reference and the Firearms Act 
Reference also posses a Guardian element, but much weaker than the others listed in this 
category with only 3 and 6 mentions, respectively.  
Yet, contrasted with the Laskin era, the case distribution is perhaps more surprising. 
Cases in the Laskin era that possessed a strong Guardian dimension were often around 
the era of the actual constitutional negotiations and patriation. By contrast, those that are 
noted as Guardian cases in the McLachlin era reference a wider variety of subject matter 
including criminal matters (Firearms Reference), civil matters (Same Sex Marriage 
Reference), health (the Assisted Human Reproduction Act Reference) and finance (the 
Securities Act Reference), among others. Similarly, cases that that might be expected to 
have a strong Public Will element (the Same Sex Marriage Reference and the Assisted 
Human Reproduction Act Reference) have comparatively little or no references to this 
theme.  
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Table 5 Majority/Dissent Thematic Comparisons 
Case Structure Majority 
Themes 
Dissent Themes 
Re Anti Inflation Act 
(Laskin) 
Majority, concurrence, 
dissent (Beetz, 
Grandpré) 
Institutional Guardian of the 
Constitution 
Re Agricultural 
Products Marketing 
(Laskin) 
Majority with unwritten 
dissent84 (Spence and 
Dickson) 
Federalism No theme 
Re Resolution to 
amend the 
Constitution 
(Laskin) 
Majority with two 
dissents (Martland and 
Ritchie) (Laskin, Estey, 
McIntyre) 
Guardian of the 
Constitution 
Guardian of the 
Constitution 
Re Exported Natural 
Gas Tax (Laskin) 
Majority with one 
dissent (Laskin, 
McIntyre, Lamer) 
Guardian of the 
Constitution  
Guardian of the 
Constitution 
Ownership of the 
Bed of the Strait of 
Georgia and Related 
Areas (Laskin) 
Majority with two 
dissents (Ritchie) 
(Wilson) 
No theme Guardian of the 
Constitution 
(Negligible) 
Wiretap Reference 
(Laskin) 
Majority with one 
dissent (Dickson and 
Chouinard) 
No theme Public Will 
(Negligible) 
Re Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act 
(McLachlin) 
Plurality, plurality, one 
dissent (Cromwell) 
Guardian of the 
Constitution, 
Federalism 
No theme 
Re Supreme Court Majority, one dissent Federalism, Institutional 
                                                 
84
 Dubin J.A. dissenting only as to the validity of s. 2(2)(a) of the federal Agricultural Products Marketing 
Act and of s. 4(a) of the Ontario Egg Order. 
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Act, ss. 5 and 6 
(McLachlin) 
(Moldaver) Guardian of the 
Constitution 
(Negligible) 
One last element of empirical analysis that provides a useful contrast is comparing 
narrative tendencies in divided decisions. Tables 5 and 6 provide the dominant narrative 
themes for the majority and dissents in those decisions that have more than one (non-
concurring) reasoning. Some interesting trends can be observed in comparing the data 
between the Laskin and McLachlin Courts. First, in all but a few cases, the trends 
discourses found in the majority decision are found in the dissenting opinions – often to a 
greater extent. Interestingly, in the case of the Patriation Reference, while the same 
narratives were used in the majority decision and the dissent, a greater number of all three 
narratives (Institutional, Guardian and Federalism) were present in the dissent than the 
majority opinion, signalling that the dissenting judges were particular concerned with 
establishing their voice with respect to these frequently used narratives. The same was 
true in the Exported Natural Gas Tax Reference. However, not all dissents follow the 
majority. In the Anti-Inflation Act Reference, the dissent made use of the Guardian 
narrative, which was absent from the majority’s written opinion. In the Agricultural 
Products Marketing Reference, the dissent used no thematic cues; all were observed in 
the majority’s decision. Finally, in the two split decisions in the McLachlin era, narratives 
were found almost exclusively in the majorities’ decisions, with the dissents omitting any 
of the four narratives almost completely. 
As these findings relate to the stated hypotheses, we do see evidence of all four narratives 
to varying degree. However, we see no particular trend toward one style of decision 
(unanimous vs. divided decision) or even one era of the Court using narratives more than 
others. Rather, the dominant trends appear to be related to how often both Courts use two 
of the four themes – the Guardian of the Constitution and the Federalism themes – to a 
far greater extent than the others. There is some evidence, as noted above, that the Public 
Will narrative was all but absent in the pre-Charter era – confirming with the expectations 
in the comparative hypothesis. However, the overall rate of the use of the Public Will 
narrative is too low to truly be able to extract a meaningful trend. Another nuanced, but 
ultimately limited finding relates to the use of the Institutional theme – one that was used 
  41 
to a great extent in the Anti-Inflation Act Reference, but little elsewhere (across either era 
of the Court). 
Table 6 Majority/Dissent Thematic Comparisons 
 Majority Dissent 
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Laskin 
Re Anti Inflation Act 10   4   4 1 
Re Agricultural Products Marketing 4  3 11     
Re Resolution to amend the Constitution 3  16 6   27 13 
Re Exported Natural Gas Tax   6 1   19 4 
Ownership of the Bed of the Strait of 
Georgia and Related Areas 
   0   1  
Wiretap Reference      1   
McLachlin 
Re Assisted Human Reproduction Act 1  16 10     
Re Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6 7 2 13 18 1    
While the empirical analysis provides a useful guide to aggregate trends in the two eras 
of the Court’s decision, further exploration of the individual themes through exemplar 
cases is a useful way to comment in greater depth on how these themes are applied in 
advisory opinions. The analysis below takes four cases, each of which contains a high 
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proportion of one of the four narratives. Two cases, the Patriation Reference (Guardian 
of the Constitution) and the Anti-Inflation Act Reference (Institutional) are found within 
the Laskin era, while the other two, the Securities Act Reference (Federalism) and the 
Employment Insurance Act Reference (Public Will), are a product of the McLachlin era 
(see Table 7). These four cases were chosen, not only because they represent archetypal 
cases, but because one in each pair includes one of the two dominant themes. Where 
useful, I bring in narrative comparisons with additional cases from the other era of the 
Court, specifically where there is evidence of evolution in the use of that narrative. In this 
way, I am able to perform cross- and within-case comparisons.  
 
Table 7 Exemplar Cases 
Court 
Origin 
Governor In Council Appeal from Province 
Laskin 
Anti Inflation Act 
Reference [1976] 
Patriation Reference 
[1981] 
McLachlin 
Securities Act 
Reference [2011] 
Employment Insurance Act 
(Can) ss 22 and 23 [2005] 
 
4.2 Four Narratives Unbound: Exemplar Cases 
Guardian of the Constitution 
Reference re Resolution to Amend the Constitution [1981] 1 SCR 753 
The 1981 Reference re Resolution to Amend the Constitution is one of the more well-
tread pieces of Supreme Court jurisprudence.85 The details of the Patriation Reference 
(as it is often called) are well-known and not recounted in detail here; however, the 
general thrust of the case was that it arose from three provincial appeals from Manitoba, 
                                                 
85
 See Peter H. Russell, “The Patriation and Quebec Veto References: The Supreme Court Wrestles with 
the Political Part of the Constitution” (2011) 54 SCLR (2d) 69, Mathen, supra note 9, among others. 
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Newfoundland and Quebec – each having posed questions to their own Courts of Appeal 
about the level of accord required for the patriation of the Constitution (in the proposed 
Constitution Act, 1981), which would ultimately take place the following year.  While the 
nature of the questions posed by the provinces was similar, the Court faced a challenge in 
navigating a series of complex legal issues with a heavy political dimension. To say that 
the Patriation Reference was a clear example of shifting the venue to obtain a strategic 
advantage in inter-governmental relations is an understatement.86  
Without repeating the lengthy text of the three sets of reference questions, they can be 
summarized as dealing with two core issues: First, whether the federal government had 
the ability to unilaterally request an amendment of the Constitution (which had to be done 
through Westminster)87, and second, whether there is a convention or a constitutional 
obligation that the federal government should have the agreement of the provinces to 
amend the Constitution as it relates to federal-provincial relations.88 These can be 
referred to as the constitutional question and the convention question, respectively.89 
The complexity of the questions gave rise to an equally complicated set of answers. In 
their divided decision (two majority opinions and two dissents – one on the constitutional 
question and one on the issue of conventions), the Court found common ground on the 
first question: the federal government’s proposed amendment of the constitution was 
indeed “within the legislative competence of the Houses of the Parliament of Canada 
notwithstanding the fact that it affected provincial legislative powers.”90 On the second 
                                                 
86
 See Mathen, supra note 9. 
87
 Declining to answer, the Manitoba Court of Appeal described Question 1 as “premature”: 
88
 Newfoundland included a fourth questions specific to the province’s consent which the Court declined to 
answer. Quebec framed its two questions (each with its own two sub-questions along similar lines, but 
using different text. 
89
 Russell, supra note 85. 
90
 Patriation Reference, supra note 11 at 758. Martland and Ritchie JJ. asked whether Parliament 
possessed the legal authority to pass a resolution, arguing that such an act would be inconsistent with the 
federal arrangement as determined in the BNA Act, 1867. 
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issue, the Court reaffirmed the existence and value of conventions, and indeed, agreed 
that there was a convention of a “substantial degree of provincial consent”91, but they 
stopped short of saying that conventions were justiciable.92 
The Court appeared well-aware that they were engaging in a meta-constitutional analysis 
that was outside of their routine case load. Thus, it is unsurprising that they elected to 
articulate what Mathen refers to as “a narrative focused on structural legitimacy and 
systemic safeguards” of the Constitution – a sort of conservation effort of the original 
constitutional order, lest the appetite for a new constitutional legacy ran roughshod over 
the existing constitutional structure.93 In their expression of their own role in this 
decision, the justices, both in their majority opinions and in their respective dissents made 
clear that they were articulating the bounds of the constitution. 
Writing for the majority, the Chief Justice applied the Guardian narrative in two areas in 
particular. The first is with respect to the preservation of the federal arrangement as it is 
envisaged in the 1867 British North America Act. Speaking to the issue of whether the 
proposed amendments would risk the positions of the provinces and their spheres of 
influence, ultimately rendering Canada a quasi-unitary state, the Chief Justice noted, 
“[T]hat is not what the present Resolution envisages because the essential federal 
character of the country is preserved under the enactments proposed by the Resolution.”94 
In doing so, he made a clear statement of the Court’s protection of the federal character 
of the country by preserving the hierarchy of the federal government’s authority over the 
provinces in key areas (also an articulation of the Institutional motivation). Continuing 
on, the Chief Justice further preserved the constitutional structure, again basing the 
Court’s argument for constitutional authority in the text of the British North America Act. 
The proposed Constitution Act, he argued, “does not, either in terms or by implication, 
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 Patriation Reference, supra note 11 at 904-905. 
92
 See Mathen, supra note 9 at 164. 
93
 Ibid at 165. 
94
 Patriation Reference, supra note 11 at 807. 
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control this authority or require that it [federal authority] be subordinated to provincial 
assent. Nor does the Statute of Westminster, 1931 interpose any requirement of such 
assent. If anything, it leaves the position as it was before its enactment. Developments 
subsequent thereto do not affect the legal position.”95 Such statements make clear the 
Court’s position as a protector of the structure of the constitution, and the structure of the 
constitution, itself, as protecting, rather than undermining federalism.  
The second area where the majority applied the Guardian narrative was in its response to 
the issue of whether convention dictated that the provinces must consent to the 
amendment of the constitution and therefore the proposed Constitution Act. Again, the 
Chief Justice relied on the reinforcement of the constitutional order using the text of the 
BNA itself to justify limitations placed on the use of convention in the legal order. After 
canvassing the material presented to the bench by provincial counsel that argued the 
presence of applicability of a provincial consent convention, the Chief Justice used 
several short statements that evoked the Guardian narrative. The majority concluded that 
counsel for the appeal had not produced evidence of “explicit recognition of a convention 
as having matured into a rule of law”96 and that the “attempted assimilation of the growth 
of a convention to the growth of the common law is misconceived.”97 In taking a more 
textual tone to the constitution, the Chief Justice further placed strong bounds around the 
(then-) present constitutional order by rejecting the argument that the case law presented 
to the Court had given legal force to conventions – an argument, that the Chief Justice 
called “an over-drawn proposition.”98 These forceful statements and their collocutors 
would contribute to a narrative that would ultimately contribute to a (albeit complex) 
constitutional order that valued the many unwritten aspects of common law, including the 
                                                 
95
 Ibid at 808. 
96
 Ibid at 774. 
97
 Ibid at 775. 
98
 Ibid at 775. 
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convention, but placed firm bounds around the applicability of conventions to override 
formalistic, written constitutional text. 
While the Guardian discourse of protecting the integrity of the Constitution is evident in 
the majority opinions, as noted above, it plays out to a greater degree in the dissents. In a 
powerful dissent by Martland and Ritchie JJ, rejecting interpretations of the federal 
government’s authority to amend the constitution without the consent of the provinces, 
we see one of the Court’s few clear statements of its role as it related to constitutional 
protection. The dissent expressly invoked the Court’s duty to uphold the structure of the 
Constitution.99 In writing about the ability for the federal government to unilaterally limit 
the powers of its provincial counterpart, the justices not only delineate that the powers 
held by the federal government “excluded the power to do anything inconsistent with the 
B.N.A. Act” and that the “exercise of such a power has no support in constitutional 
convention.”100 Indeed, in their dissent, Martland and Ritchie made a rare declarative 
statement of the Court’s Guardian role stating that: “it is the proper function of this Court, 
in its role of protecting and preserving the Canadian constitution, to declare that no such 
power exists.”101 Such clear articulation of the Guardian role makes a case for why the 
Guardian narrative overpowers the others in volume and consistency across the two eras 
of the Court under study here. 
Similarly, in their dissent on the convention question, the Chief Justice, writing for 
himself, Estey and McIntyre JJ, took a different approach to applying the Guardian 
narrative. Holding that there was no legal impediment to constitutional amendment by the 
federal government, the dissent also noted that there was no convention requiring 
provincial consent to constitutional amendment. Despite the difference in outcome, the 
judges employed a similar discourse. In defending the absence of a convention, the Chief 
Justice and his colleagues positioned the Court as the arbiter and protector of the 
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 See Mathen, supra note 9 at 159. 
100
 Patriation Reference, supra note 11 at 848. 
101
 Ibid at 848. 
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constitutional order through another rare explicit statement about the Court’s role. Courts, 
they argued, are empowered to “recognize the existence of conventions”, particularly 
when asked to do so through the reference mechanism.102 They may also strike down the 
strength or legitimacy of that convention as it relates to the practice of federalism as the 
Chief Justice argued later in the decision.103 Framing his reasoning as the preservation of 
the constitution (“We are concerned solely with their constitutionality”), the Chief Justice 
noted that the insupportability of the convention stems from the inability to bind 
governments according to a particular degree of consent that nobody, including the Court, 
was willing to define.104 
That the Supreme Court emerged as “a critical agent of constitutional change”105 in their 
complex response to the questions posed in the Patriation Reference was, in part, their 
own doing. In applying the Guardian narrative throughout their decision – both majority 
and dissenting opinions – the Court not only produced the basis upon which much 
subsequent legal analysis would be drawn (i.e. the emergent discussion around the value 
and justiciability of conventions), but they also reiterated, regardless of their division, the 
discourse of the Court as the Guardian of the Constitution – often in explicit terms. 
Mathen notes the challenges associated with rendering such a divided opinion (the stigma 
from which may have encouraged the later Court to issue controversial decisions per 
curiam)106, however, the Court, from the Patriation Reference onward, has appeared to 
wear that mantle formidably. 
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 Ibid at 872. 
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 See Mathen, supra note 9 at 164. 
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Umpire of Federalism 
Reference re Securities Act, 2011 SCC 66, [2011] 3 SCR 837 
Like the Patriation Reference, the Securities Act Reference also originated with the 
concerns of the provinces. While the questions posed to the Court came from the 
Governor in Council, the case addressed certain provincial governments’ concerns about 
the Harper Government’s proposed Securities Act. Securities, at the time of the proposal 
(and still now), were regulated at the provincial level; the intent of the federal legislation 
was to create a new, national securities regulator. The Act, which never received Royal 
Assent, was positioned by the provinces as falling outside the legislative authority of the 
Canadian Parliament under section 91(2), the trade and commerce power. Interveners for 
Alberta, Manitoba, Quebec and New Brunswick argued that the subject matter of the Act 
trenched on provincial jurisdiction, namely their right to regulate securities under the 
property and civil rights powers in section 92(13), and the ability to regulate matters of a 
merely local nature under section 92(16).107 
The per curiam decision delivered by the Court vindicated provincial concerns. The 
Court held that the Act was ultra vires the federal government’s trade and commerce 
power, even though it also recognized the need for and encouraged further collaboration 
among the federal government and provinces to create a securities regulator at the 
national level. Their reasoning for striking the legislation down was jurisdictional, but the 
Court explained their decision by way of stating that the Act was counter to the 
“dominant tide of modern federalism” whose hallmarks were its cooperative and flexible 
nature. The decision emphasized one of the defining dimensions of the Umpire of 
Federalism motivation – namely, that competing understandings of federalism might give 
way to different interpretations of individual pieces of legislation or powers held by the 
two levels of government. Further, how the Court viewed the federal arrangement could 
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very much influence the outcome of jurisdictional debates, which were anything but 
forgone conclusions. 
In striking down the legislation that would establish a national securities regulator, the 
Court engaged in a pith and substance analysis of the legislation. Even though securities 
regulation did have aspects that legitimately fell within the bounds of trade and 
commerce, the Court articulated the need to circumscribe the scope of the trade and 
commerce clause to recognize “the diversity and autonomy of provincial governments in 
developing their societies within their respective spheres of jurisdiction”.108 Drawing on 
General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing109, the Court noted that, under 
the general branch of s. 91(2), “legislation must engage the national interest in a manner 
that is qualitatively different from provincial concerns”110, and the Act, which appeared 
to simply amalgamate provincial power failed to do so. Yet, the Court stopped short of 
truncating the trade and commerce power, moments later balancing its statements with a 
declaration that, “At the same time, failure to give meaningful scope to the general trade 
and commerce power would violate the notion of balance between the federal and 
provincial orders of government inherent in the division of powers and impermissibly 
amend the Constitution.”111 This sort of balancing statement provided for national 
commercial regulation with out “endangering ‘the very idea of the local’ in provincial 
commercial regulation”.112 
This reinforcement of a message of balance is at the core of the Umpire of Federalism 
narrative. It identifies the Court as a neutral arbiter of jurisdictional matters without 
presupposing an answer to a specific question. While the Act clearly engaged matters of 
national importance, the Court framed its decision in the language of differentiating – 
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with precision – matters that fall clearly into one jurisdiction without taking liberties that 
would derogate from the powers of the other jurisdiction. Thus, the main thrust of the Act 
does not address a matter of such national importance that it could not successfully be 
kept to its current provincial status is suggestive of the Court making a technical “call” on 
the legislation in question to not only preserve, but balance, jurisdictional authority in a 
manner that is reflective of the contemporary federation. 
Here, it becomes important to differentiate between a Guardian motivation or discourse 
and an Umpire of Federalism narrative. Surely, to some degree, there is overlap as the 
subject matter of jurisdiction relates both to the constitutional arrangement and to 
federalism. However, the distinction between the two is an important one: while the 
Guardian discourse is protective of the constitutional arrangement as a whole, it values 
the text and spirit of the document that created federalism. The Umpire discourse, by 
contrast, is one that protects the outcome of that arrangement and, in doing so, preserves 
the balance between the levels of government. Federalism, the Court notes, is created 
through the “constitutional balance envisaged by ss. 91 and 92” and a failure to preserve 
that balance would have an outcome of “undermin[ing] the federalism principle”.113 This 
motivation is further evident in the Court’s statement: 
It is a fundamental principle of federalism that both federal and provincial powers must 
be respected, and one power may not be used in a manner that effectively eviscerates 
another.  Rather, federalism demands that a balance be struck, a balance that allows both 
the federal Parliament and the provincial legislatures to act effectively in their respective 
spheres. Accepting Canada’ interpretation of the general trade and commerce power 
would disrupt rather than maintain that balance. Parliament cannot regulate the whole of 
the securities system simply because aspects of it have a national dimension.114   
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Such a statement is a clear indictment of government action outside of the bounds of the 
federal arrangement, even if such action is viewed as normatively desirable by other 
provinces, the federal government or the Court itself.  
Yet, one cannot blindly state that, in using the Umpire narrative, the Court pursues a strict 
delineation of powers to stifle government activity. Rather, the Court used the Umpire 
narrative to encourage the levels of government to enhance federalism by continuing to 
operate in a manner that allowed both to flourish. Much like the analogy of the umpire, 
the Court used its position to articulate for a fair and cooperative approach to resolving a 
policy dispute, alluding to “the spirit of cooperative federalism”115, cooperation as an 
“animating force” of federalism116, and “a restrained approach to doctrines like federal 
paramountcy”117. Of course, this discourse is reflective of a contemporary version of 
federalism that stems from the cooperative federalism that emerged in the post-war era 
and re-emerged in the form of collaborative federalism in the late 1990s.118 This 
discourse of cooperation was further evident in the Court’s encouragement of the 
provincial and federal government to continue to work on a coordinated scheme for 
securities regulation. Speaking to the subject matter of the case, the Court went as far as 
to note that the “experience of other federations in the field of securities regulation, while 
a function of their own constitutional requirements, suggests that a cooperative approach 
might usefully be explored”.119  
Another way in which the Court pronounces its umpire role is through its rejection of 
rigidity and strict textual interpretations of the constitution. Unlike the Guardian 
motivation, which might more readily adhere to textual principles, the Umpire discourse 
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eschews “rigid formalism in favour of accommodating cooperative intergovernmental 
efforts”.120 Citing its earlier decision in OPSEU, the Court downplayed watertight 
compartments, stating that there were not “the dominant tide of constitutional doctrines; 
rather they have been an undertow against the strong pull of pith and substance, the 
aspect doctrine and, in recent years, a very restrained approach to concurrency and 
paramountcy issues”.121 
Yet, one does not have to be satisfied with a reading of the Court’s ratio alone to accept 
the Umpire narrative. Similar to statements made in the Patriation Reference, the Court 
formally articulated its role as an Umpire. Referencing the distinction between 
jurisdictional powers made within sections 91 and 92, the Court identifies itself as the 
logical “impartial arbiter of jurisdictional disputes”. Referencing its earlier decisions in 
the Reference re Remuneration of Judges and Northern Telecom Canada122, the Court 
repeats its unique position as the arbiter who is able to “control the limits of the 
respective sovereignties”.123 Such a clear statement of the Umpire motivation, not only as 
a discourse upon which the Court could rely to articulate its rulings, but also as a broader 
raison d’être, is telling of the depth of the Umpire discourse in the Court’s view of its 
place among the branches of government. 
While the Court did note their inability to condone legislation that was ultimately ultra 
vires, they concluded their analysis on a reconciling note. Reiterating their message of 
cooperative and flexible federalism, the Court suggested that a scheme that recognizes 
the essentially provincial nature of securities regulation while allowing Parliament to deal 
with genuinely national concerns remains available. In suggesting this path forward, they 
emphasized that, while flexibility and cooperation are important to federalism, they 
cannot override or modify the separation of powers. In a statement that truly reflects the 
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umpire motivation, the Court stopped short of cooperation at any cost and reiterated that 
balance between the two levels of government would only come with “the respect that 
each level of government has for each other’s own sphere of jurisdiction”.124 “The 
federalism principle upon which Canada’ constitutional framework rests,” they argued 
demands nothing less.”125 
 
Institutional  
Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, [1976] 2 SCR 373 
The Reference re the Anti-Inflation Act was the first reference case of the Laskin era. The 
decision, which featured a majority opinion written by the Chief Justice, a concurrence 
penned by Ritchie J, and a dissent by Beetz J (joined by de Grandpré J) was one of the 
few that featured an Institutional narrative. The decision deviated from almost all other 
Supreme Court references in that it takes a very strong opinion in favour of the federal 
government’s right to legislate in economic matters that have serious implications for the 
provinces, but it also uses, to great effect, the vocabulary of protecting the federal 
government’s emergency powers (outside of wartime) in matters of national concern.  
The case is derived from the federal government’s enactment of the Anti-Inflation Act126 
in 1975, and its subsequent questions posed through the Governor-in-Council to the 
Court with respect to whether the law was ultra vires the federal government’s power to 
legislate to combat inflation. Inflation is not a specifically enumerated area of policy 
jurisdiction under section 91 or 92, nor are the circumstances around the Act simple 
enough to house under the federal trade and commerce power; however, Parliament was 
basing the legislation of price and wage controls to combat inflation on the “peace, order 
and good government” (POGG) clause, more specifically, the idea of a national 
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emergency that required the federal government to step into an area that had both national 
and provincial implications. Though the Act in question did not specifically mention 
emergency conditions, the Court ruled that the “highly exceptional economic conditions 
in time of peace”127 (as outlined in a White Paper that preceded the Act – discussed 
below) provided sufficient cause for the Court to recognize the national concern 
dimension that motivated the implementation of the Act. 
The locus of the Institutional motivation in this case comes from the majority reasoning 
and Ritchie, Martland and Pigeon JJ’s concurrence. Writing for the majority, the Chief 
Justice situates his answer in a broader understanding of the importance of federalism, a 
recognition of the power of the provinces to regulate their own civil services, as well as 
the trend toward cooperative federalism that led up to the 1976 decision, but denies that 
an inarticulation of the federal power is required to maintain it.128 He goes so far as to 
say that an attempt to engage the provinces on the matter is not required; rather, even 
though a cooperative agreement “might have been attempted, […] it does not follow that 
the federal policy that was adopted is vulnerable because a co-operative scheme on a 
legislative power basis was not tried first”.129 In doing so, the Chief Justice dislocates 
this case from what might be perceived as a traditional Umpire of Federalism narrative. 
Rather than encouraging inter-government cooperation (as was done in the 
aforementioned Securities Act Reference), the Court specifically states that this type of 
cooperation was possible, but not required. In doing so, the Court articulated a different 
narrative in dealing with a matter related to federalism: namely, that there are times 
where umpiring the federal arrangement might be superseded by a clear statement of 
federal authority.   
Located within that understanding of the desirability, but lack of requirement, of a federal 
arrangement, the Chief Justice notes the strength of the federal government’s position to 
                                                 
127
 Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, [1976] 2 SCR 373 at 376. 
128
 Ibid at 421. 
129
 Ibid. 
  55 
enact such legislation under the POGG clause. Referencing the preamble to the Act, he 
notes that the text was “sufficiently indicative that Parliament was introducing a far-
reaching programme prompted by what in its view was a serious national condition”.130 
He contradicts the submissions of the provinces noting that their interpretation of the Act 
as trenching on their control of their own public services “misconceive[s] the paramount 
authority of federal legislative power when exercised, and the all-embracing legislative 
authority of the Parliament of Canada when validly exercised for the peace, order and 
good government of Canada”.131 Therein lies the Chief Justice’s Institutional narrative. 
By positioning the Act as a clear manifestation of the “all-embracing legislative 
authority” of the federal government, he distinguishes the unique motivation of the Court 
to preserve federal authority under an interpretive clause that could have just as easily 
been narrowed through the Court’s ruling.  
Concurring with the Chief Justice, Ritchie J, notes the critical nature of the Act and the 
location of Parliament’s authority to deal with it in the POGG clause. While Ritchie J 
varies slightly from the Chief Justice’s reasoning, he notes the need for the Act to be 
interpreted in conjunction with a White Paper on the state of the concern that preceded 
the Act. This is an essential element of the Institutionalist discourse. While the federal 
government did not use the vocabulary of “emergency” or “peace, order and good 
government” in the Act, the Supreme Court appeared to read into the legislation an 
element of “serious national concern” that could give force to the use of the POGG 
power. According to Ritchie J, when the Act is “read against the background of these 
excerpts from the White Paper it becomes apparent that they were employed by 
Parliament in recognition of the existence of a national Emergency”.132 The Court, of 
course, did not have to articulate this depth of the national dimension for the federal 
government and could have, just as easily, rebuked the legislative efforts of that 
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government for failing to motivate its case. However, the Court instead protected and 
upheld federal authority (with limitations) and enabled the legislation to stand.  
The dissent authored by Beetz J took a different view and is a useful exemplar of a case 
wherein the majority and dissent use competing narratives to frame their reasoning. In 
writing for Grandpré J and himself, Beetz J gave weight to the implications of 
globalisation and the fluctuations of the international market on federalism. The 
accompanying narrative evoked a strong Guardian of the Constitution narrative with 
Beetz noting that the growth of certain sectors – particularly those in economic policy – 
were susceptible to being, pro tanto, a national matter simply because of the rapidly 
globalizing nature of the domestic economies. The effect, he argued, was that, when 
taken to its logical conclusion, all matters would be rendered federal powers under the 
national concern dimension resulting in “a fundamental feature of the Constitution, its 
federal nature, the distribution of powers between Parliament and the Provincial 
Legislatures, would disappear not gradually but rapidly.”133 Contradicting federal 
counsel’s submission that the Act is what Beetz J calls an “an erroneous characterization 
of the Anti-Inflation Act” and argues that the Act itself and federal counsel’s articulation 
of its purpose are “quite distinguishable and they do not, in my view, stand for what they 
are said to stand”.134 In doing so, Beetz J gives rise to an interpretation of the Act as 
disrupting the constitutional order and needing to be limited to prevent jurisdictional 
creep. 
The conflict between the majority and the dissent notwithstanding, as noted above, it is 
essential that we think of the Institutional motivation not as wholly contradictory to the 
Guardian or Umpire motivation, but as a sort of version or outcome of these that 
emphasizes the Court’s relationship in upholding federal authority. The Anti-Inflation Act 
Reference is noted as much for the Court’s decision to allow the legislation to stand as it 
is for the limits placed on the mandate given to the federal government by making that 
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legislation temporary. Among the more important observations about the Court’s 
Institutional narrative is that, in its reasoning, the Court limited the possibility that the 
POGG power was to be dramatically expanded, but opened up the possibility of fairly 
easy access to the emergency use of the power in peacetime.135 It also gave rise to the 
observation that the Court is able to rule in the favour of the federal government while 
still upholding the balance of power and preventing further centralization of policy-
making authority.136  
The Court’s decision in the Anti-Inflation Act Reference went on to have implications for 
a host of future SCC decisions. In particular, the Court’s ruling on emergency economic 
conditions would come up again in the Provincial Judges Reference twenty years later. 
While the outcome of that decision is often contested because of the Court’s own 
perceived strategic ruling137, it is also a case wherein the Court used its considerable 
authority to weigh into complex economic matters.  
 
Public Will  
Reference re Employment Insurance Act (Can.), ss. 22 and 23, [2005] 2 SCR 669, 2005 
SCC 56 
The final narrative captured in this study, like the Institutional narrative before it, is one 
that receives considerably less attention than its Guardian and Umpire collocutors. The 
Employment Insurance Act Reference came up on an appeal, by right, from the Quebec 
Court of Appeal in 2005. The case referred to the Court sections 22 and 23 of the federal 
Employment Insurance Act, which were contested by the government of Quebec as ultra 
vires the federal government’s power in social policy issues. The Government of Quebec, 
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desiring to establish its own set of policies governing maternity and parental leave, asked 
the federal government to reduce Quebecker’s contributions to the federal scheme to fund 
the Quebec plan. In their unanimous decision, the Court upheld the legislation, 
overturning the Quebec Court of Appeal’s earlier decision, and holding that the 
legislation deadline with maternity and parental leave benefits is a valid exercise of the 
federal jurisdiction over unemployment insurance. While the case is largely about 
jurisdictional authority, the Court’s framing of its ratio brings to light a particular 
emphasis on the changing social conditions that indicate a need for clarity and, indeed, 
generosity in matters of income replacement for women.  
The Employment Insurance Act Reference is unique in that few others contain any aspect 
of the Public Will narrative. The next closest to characterising the Public Will narrative is 
the Same-Sex Marriage Reference [2004], handed down by the Court in the previous 
year. Perhaps in some ways, these two decisions should be considered alongside one 
another, as they were both instances wherein the Court used its considerable influence to 
direct public policy in line with public opinion. Though the Canadian public was perhaps 
more galvanized over the issue of same-sex marriage than it was about extending 
maternity and paternity benefits, both decisions reflect the Court’s willingness to enter 
into the political fray on issues that have a very tangible application to the lives of many 
Canadians. Of course, the Court’s decision on EI benefits is likely lesser known than its 
same-sex marriage counterpart, even though maternity and paternity benefits directly 
affect a greater number of Canadians. However, given that the nature of the question 
posed was jurisdictional, rather than whether benefits would be assigned (they would 
have, by one government or another, regardless of the outcome), it is likely that fewer 
Canadians felt that the decision would have an effect on their work lives. 
The question in the EI Act Reference case was whether the Act fell within federal 
jurisdiction over unemployment insurance. While the Court’s response maintained the 
necessary pith and substance analysis required of a jurisdictional case, the Court chose 
not to limit its analysis solely to the technicalities of the constitutional assignment of 
policy authority. Citing its own examination of the “living tree” metaphor in the Same-
Sex Marriage Reference, the Court noted that it “takes a progressive approach to ensure 
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that Confederation can be adapted to new social realities”.138 They note that legislative 
competence is dynamic and that jurisdiction over unemployment insurance must be 
interpreted “progressively and generously” 139, signalling the Court’s willingness to 
engage in policy change to reflect contemporary social norms. 
Following their introductory statements about interpretive doctrines, the Court examines 
the purpose of maternity benefits and the context in which unemployment insurance and 
maternity benefits, more specifically, were adopted. It is here that the Public Will 
narrative takes shape, but in a passive way. In their examination of context, the Court 
notes the evolving nature of the workforce and the entry en masse of women into the 
labour force, citing the government’s own Report of the Study for Updating the 
Unemployment Insurance Programme (1968) (the Cousineau Report)140 and White 
Paper, entitled Unemployment Insurance in the 70’s (1970)141, as examples of texts 
where the government itself has justified the expansion of EI benefits across potentially 
vulnerable groups.  
Yet, it is in the section of the Court’s decision that described maternity benefits as a type 
of employment insurance that the Court’s ratio truly manifests the Public Will narrative. 
This takes two different forms: first, a discussion of how the evolution of the workforce 
has moved to incorporate women, and second, how the evolution of family structures 
have moved toward equal or shared parenting responsibility between both spouses. In the 
first aspect of the Public Will narrative, the Court frames its understanding of maternity 
benefits as falling with general employment benefits by emphasizing the “extent of the 
protection required by Canadian society changes with the needs of the labour force”, the 
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growing portion of the labour force that is made up of women, and that “particular needs 
[of women in the labour force] that are of concern to society as a whole.”142 Further, the 
Court signals the need for change in the way that maternity benefits are viewed by both 
government and by society at large. They argue that “[a]n interruption of employment 
due to maternity can no longer be regarded as a matter of individual responsibility” and 
that “[t]o limit a public unemployment insurance plan […] would amount to denying its 
social function”.143 The Court then concludes this analysis with a strong statement of the 
Public Will narrative in noting that the “social nature of unemployment insurance 
requires that Parliament be able to adapt the plan to the new realities of the 
workplace.”144 Taken together, these statements correspond with an interpretation of the 
development of labour and insurance practices that must retain the essence of the times 
and should progress with the direction of society’s understanding of the role of labour.  
The second aspect of the Court’s Public Will narrative takes on a more personal tone. In 
their subsequent analysis of parental benefits more broadly, the Court again takes a 
progressive stance corresponding to public opinion. In dealing with the issue of whether 
adoptive parents or fathers taking paternity leave in lieu of or alongside their partner’s 
maternity leave, the Court argues, “[a]t a time when society is stressing the responsibility 
of both parents, they cannot be treated unequally. Such an approach would be 
anachronistic”.145 They further note that two features – “the evolution of the role of 
women in the labour market and of the role of fathers in child care”146 – have had 
undeniable consequences for the structure of the labour market and family structures. 
Here, the Court clearly eschews a reactionary approach to analyzing parental leave 
benefits, commensurate with the prevailing view that both parents have parental 
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responsibilities for infants. Taking their progressive approach further, the Court makes 
another, subsequent bold statement in line with the Public Will narrative that is 
generalizable to future social policy dilemmas. In stating that “[a] generous interpretation 
of the provisions of the Constitution permits social change to be taken into account”147, 
the Court is effectively noting that it will, when appropriate, use its ruling as a venue to 
reinforce the prevailing opinions about the evolution of social norms.  
One final note about the Employment Insurance Act Reference bears stating with specific 
reference to the Court’s use of interpretive doctrines to pull out the Public Will narrative. 
Inherent within the Public Will narrative is an understanding that the public will is 
different from (usually cast as more progressive than) government policy and that the 
Court will be the balancing or, indeed, rectifying force that will correct any imbalance 
between the two. This, almost certainly, indicates a progressive interpretivist approach. 
The Court begins its written decision with a declaration of the appropriateness of the 
application of the living tree doctrine (see above). Of course, as is the case with other 
interpretative decisions by the Court (including the above Anti-Inflation Act Reference), 
the Court does not justify societal changes as carte blanche permission to change 
jurisdictional boundaries: “A progressive interpretation cannot, however,” the Court 
argues, “be used to justify Parliament in encroaching on a field of provincial 
jurisdiction.”148 However, what is interesting about the Court’s ruling in the EI Reference 
is that the Court puzzlingly evokes both interpretive and textualist interpretations in the 
same breadth. Shortly after acknowledging the living tree doctrine, the Court noted, “If 
an issue comes before a court, the court must refer to the framers’ description of the 
power in order to identify its essential components”, but then carry on to acknowledge 
that meaning “may be adapted to modern-day realities”.149 This type of reliance on both a 
declaration of interpretivist and textualist modes is not necessarily as antithetical to one 
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another as they might appear.150 However, it is suggestive of the fact that the Court is 
willing to use the available jurisprudential tools to arrive at an outcome which it believes 
is reflective of the law, and at times, social progress.  
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Chapter 4  
Discussion and Conclusion 
At the outset of this study, I hypothesized that the reference power held more than just a 
set of strategic tools for the provincial and federal executives to mobilize against one 
another. I argued that one could also learn a significant amount about how the Court 
viewed its role in handling complex issues of policy, federalism and jurisdiction that were 
directly appealed using the tool of the reference question and that the Court may have 
chosen to communicate their opinions and their understanding of their own role using 
overarching narratives – namely, the guardian of the Constitution, the Umpire of 
Federalism, the Institutional and the Public Will narratives. I also hypothesized that the 
Court might change its evaluation framework over time, particularly when Chief Justices 
change.  
Through this analysis of 21 advisory opinions, issued across two Courts, I found 
interesting corroborating evidence of some of these hypothesized trends, but also some 
limitations as to how effectively my four-part narrative framework could be applied to 
the Court’s decisions in references. Through an empirical, manual coding analysis of the 
21 decisions, it was evident that all four narratives were present to some degree, but that 
two of these narratives – the Guardian and Umpire narratives were predominant. While 
the Public Will and Institutional narratives were present, they were sufficiently limited 
enough to say that they were, at best, secondary narratives, rather than guiding 
frameworks for the Court. At the same time, when these two narratives were present – as 
was the case in the Anti-Inflation Act Reference and the Employment Insurance Act 
Reference, they spoke to important constitutional issues that had a tremendous impact on 
the economic and social policy realities of Canadians.  
Further to my hypotheses on the presence of these narratives, I suggested that pivotal 
moments, such as the implementation of the Charter, might elucidate notable trends or 
deviations from existing trends. Importantly, there appeared to be no differentiation 
between pre/post-Charter applications of the four narratives. By contrast, both the Laskin 
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and the McLachlin Courts appeared to use all four to roughly the same degree. There is 
some evidence that the later Court was more likely to use a narrative that conveyed the 
Public Will, and that the earlier Court provided the only real instance of a Institutional 
narrative that positioned the interests of the federal government above those of the 
provinces, however, these observations warrant caution because there were too few cases 
of the application of these narratives to truly support the outlined hypothesis.  
Thus, the overarching observation to arise from this detailed analysis is that more may 
unite the two Courts than separates them. The importance of the narratives that imply the 
Court’s role as guarding the constitution and umpiring federalism cannot be overstated. 
These appear to be the Court’s main frameworks for explaining their decision-making 
process. Of course, to some extent the questions posed by the Governor-in-Council or 
that are appealed to the Court from provincial courts of appeal are as much responsible 
for the outcomes as the Court’s choice of narrative. While the Court can (to an extent) 
choose to answer specific questions or decline, it remains that the Court has control over 
its docket, but it does not have control over the reference questions asked of it. Therefore, 
the Court’s narrative frameworks are inevitably structured in part by the fact that it is a 
venue for inter-governmental disputes and jurisdictional resolution. Still, the Court is free 
to answer the questions in almost whatever manner it chooses; therefore, the observations 
about a lack of diversity in the narratives applied by the Court still hold value. They 
illustrate that the Court adheres to some of its more traditionally-known roles, but will, 
when the situation requires it, adopt some narratives that particularly advance political or 
social ends.  
What also comes out of this analysis, though is not referenced in any detail in the results 
of the deductive search for the four established narratives is the presence of any other 
“undetected” or “unexpected” narratives. During the process of coding the 21 advisory 
opinions provided by the Court, it was not the case that new or persistent trends emerged 
from a critical reading. That is to say, the narratives that emerge from the literature 
appear to capture the gamut of discourses employed by the Court in dealing with 
reference matters. This is an important observation if we consider that the study of 
advisory opinions as a subset of the Court’s jurisprudence may yield alternative findings 
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from the mainstream literature. A thorough read of that body across two eras of the Court 
suggest that this is not the case, though counter-arguments could be made by further 
analyses of other eras of the Supreme Court. 
Finally, true “trends” in analysis appear to be difficult to extract even with a single 
Court’s body of jurisprudence. Rather, it might be the case that the Courts just take 
reference cases one by one and try not to use this type of case as a mode to advance one 
narrative or another. It may even be the case that the Court is somewhat “freed” in 
answering an advisory opinion as it deviates from its routine case load and provides the 
Court, just as it does the government, an opportunity to venture into deliberations that are 
difficult to draw into its standard case load.  
 
5.1 Implications of Research  
The goal of this research was to examine in detail advisory opinions as a set of judicial 
writings. Though complementary to, this study ultimately deviated from single case 
studies of individual advisory opinions. In doing so, there are several implications for the 
substantive study of the Court’s writings, but also for the methodology of examining 
large volumes of case law around several areas of jurisprudence. Unlike a 
comprehensive, comparative study of several criminal or property law cases, the unifying 
thread in this analysis was the legal venue, not the subject matter. The advisory opinion, 
for reasons set out in the earlier portion of this paper, is a unique opportunity for 
governments at both levels to engage the Court in matters of policy, constitutional or 
jurisdictional conflict. Of course, it is almost always the case that the Court is dealing 
with more than one of these matters, as the subject matter of each reference question was 
often complex and politically-loaded. Thus, studying advisory opinions gives rise to 
some important observations about the case type itself.  
The primary implication drawn from this study is that the Court uses two predominant 
narratives when deliberating and communicating its opinions on reference questions. This 
has implications for government and implications for those studying the law. For 
governments with an interest in (and the option to) refer questions to the Court, this study 
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shows that the Court is somewhat conservative in the application of narratives other than 
the Guardian and Umpire narratives. This may be reassuring for governments who fear 
that the Court will take liberties in areas of social policy or economic policy that may 
deviate from the government’s own agenda. Second, with respect to the more strategic 
uses of reference questions, this analysis shows that the Court will err on the side of 
marshalling the relationship between levels of government rather than redefining it. 
While critics of the Court may agonize over its “liberal” nature, it appears, at least in the 
case of advisory opinions, that the Court takes a fairly conservative tone in applying the 
tenets of the constitution and federalism. 
Another implication derived from this study related to the study of law is that the Court 
does, indeed, employ narrative language to communicate its decisions. While the use of 
such language is not necessarily the dominant type of communication in the written 
opinions, it does frame much of the Court’s more routine exposition on past case law and 
legislation in terms of generalizable frameworks through which the Court draws its 
reasoning, and which can (and has been) observed by legal scholars. The presence of the 
narratives may seem like a simple implication, but it remains an important one. In the 
absence of these narratives, scholars would struggle to find a unifying set of themes that 
guide the decisions. These narratives fall outside of the structural framework of the 
Court’s decisions (e.g. the references to past case law, the interpretation of legislation or 
government policy papers) and, instead, provide a set of narrative elements that 
communicate broader principles upon which the Court rests its legal opinions.  
Turning to methodological implications of this study, one of the chief advantages of this 
study is that it provides an example of the application of a mixed-methodology, 
incorporating both an empirical and a qualitative, doctrinal approach to studying the 
Court’s decisions. The benefit of this approach was that it allowed an in-depth analysis of 
a large body of case law over a significant amount of time (1976-2017) according to a 
comprehensive, replicable scheme. Though empirical efforts (both quantitative and text-
based) are less established in the study of law (coding efforts, specifically, are 
particularly rare), this approach is useful in that it allows for an evaluation of the relative 
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strength of each narrative on a case-by-case basis, thus permitting comparison across eras 
of the Court. 
The addition of the case study returns this study firmly into the mainstream of legal 
analyses, particularly those that look to engage in comparative case study. Applying the 
doctrinal approach to this comparative case study permitted a useful analysis, not only of 
the cases themselves, but it also illustrated differences between narratives that emerged 
from the two eras of the Court and from two origins of reference questions (Governor-in 
Council and appeals from the provinces). By adding this systematic comparison to the 
summary quantitative analysis, I am able to elucidate how I came to the observations in 
the quantitative analysis and assist the reader in understanding how the narratives were 
applied within the Court’s judgments.  
 
5.2 Future Directions 
This study represents a systematic, comparative analysis of 21 advisory opinions under 
the guidance of two Chief Justices. Its strength lies in the breadth of decisions it covered 
and in the application of the framework of narrative analysis to these cases. However, 
much remains to be done in interpreting how the Court sees its role in issuing advisory 
opinions or case law more generally. As suggested above, the analysis of narratives of the 
21 cases did not produce any suggestion that other narratives were excluded from this 
analysis and ought to be considered in future research, but it remains that this study only 
looked at two eras of the Court and other past (or current) Courts may contribute others.  
It also remains that analysing advisory opinions for the presence of four narratives is only 
a narrow analysis of the broader question of how the Court sees its role in issuing 
advisory opinions. There are a number of other analytical techniques that could be 
applied to this question. Interviews with present or former Supreme Court judges are the 
most obvious; however, additional review of secondary sources may also yield further 
insights. Of course, these methods are limited by practical issues such as availability and 
likelihood of a judge (current or former) speaking candidly on their experience with 
reference questions.  
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The next step for this particular project is to expand the analysis to a more historical era 
of the Court to determine the origin point of these dominant narratives. One of the most 
prominent metaphorical descriptions attributed to the Court (or its predecessor the JCPC) 
is the “living tree” metaphor of constitutional interpretation derived from the Persons 
Case. An examination of earlier Courts’ narrative construction may yield useful 
information on why the Guardian and Umpire narrative have become so prominent. This 
could also be gleaned from a comparison with non-reference cases from the same era as 
the current analysis.  
As stated in the outset of this project, advisory opinions provide a unique opportunity for 
the Court to engage with the executives on questions of contemporary policy and 
constitutional relevance. Their importance lies not only in the outcome of the decision, 
but also in the opportunity for two branches of government, who pride themselves on 
their independence, to engage with one another directly. The possibility of the 
politicization of these decisions will always make them attractive for constitutional law 
scholars to study, but they also have the potential to yield an abundance of insights about 
the role of the Court and the vision that the Court has for its position within constitutional 
order. 
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Appendix 2 Coding Guide 
What text is coded? Only the text of the full decision of the Supreme Court reference is 
coded. Headnotes, citations and footnotes are not coded. Code both majority rulings and 
dissents. 
Type of Sentence Example Coded? 
Statement of Fact “The text of the Act specifies that…” No 
Report of or 
Commentary on 
Actions or 
Statements of 
Others 
“In giving reasons for judgment for the majority of the 
Ontario Court of Appeal, MacKinnon J.A. summarized 
the main attack upon the federal and provincial 
legislation, and the orders and regulations thereunder…” 
No 
Deliberations or 
decisions of the 
Court 
“…the inclusion of former advocates of at least 10 years 
standing at the bar is consistent with the purpose of s. 5, 
which is to ensure that appointees to the Court have 
adequate legal experience.” 
Yes 
Deliberations or 
decisions of past 
Courts (excluding 
JCPC) 
“Dickson C.J. explained that where the general trade 
and commerce power is advanced as a ground of 
constitutional validity, a "careful case by case analysis 
remains appropriate" (General Motors, at p. 663).” 
Yes 
Explanation of 
general legal 
doctrine 
“This constitution depends then on statutes and common 
law rules which declare the law and have the force of 
law, and upon customs, usages and conventions 
developed in political science which, while not having 
the force of law in the sense that there is a legal 
enforcement process or sanction available for their 
breach, form a vital part of the constitution without 
which it would be incomplete and unable to serve its 
No 
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purpose.” 
Quotes from other 
authors 
“In his work on constitutional law, Peter Russell 
notes…” 
No 
Text of statute, 
other case law 
“The White Paper, after reviewing the procedures 
followed in respect of amendments to the Act, went on 
to state four general principles, as follows: 
The first general principle that emerges...” 
No 
Coded statements are those that inherently express the Court’s view on the legal issue at 
hand and embody their role as an arbiter of the issue or making a declaration about the 
law. 
Some statements must be read in context. For example, in the Patriation Reference (at 
848): dissenting justices Martland and Ritchie state, “There is no statutory basis for the 
exercise of such a power.” Reading that sentence alone does not readily suggest one 
frame or another. However, in the context of the dissent, it is a clear statement protecting 
federalism.  
Others may be more explicit. For example, also in the In the Patriation Reference (at 
848): “This being so, it is the proper function of this Court, in its role of protecting and 
preserving the Canadian constitution, to declare that no such power exists.” This is a clear 
statement of how the Court views its role as the guardian of the constitution.  
How is it coded? The unit of measurement is the sentence, therefore coding is done on a 
per sentence basis. Each unit can have multiple outcomes: it can remain uncoded (if it 
does not represent one of the four themes; it can be coded with any single theme; it can 
be coded with multiple themes).  
 
Thematic Description Example 
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Role 
Inter-
Institutional  
The Supreme Court defers 
to the executive in 
law/policymaking matters 
Again, there is no delegation of 
administrative power by Parliament; if 
anything, there is delegation by the 
Government of Ontario to the federal 
authorities. (Re Anti-Inflation Act, [1976]) 
Public Will The Supreme Court sees its 
role as limiting the authority 
of the executive to act 
unilaterally, instead 
promoting some conception 
of what the public desires 
This metaphor has endured as the 
preferred approach in constitutional 
interpretation, ensuring "that 
Confederation can be adapted to new 
social realities" (Re Securities Act, [2011]) 
Guardian of 
the 
Constitution 
The Supreme Court sees its 
role as the protector of 
constitutional architecture 
If the power asserted is not found in the 
Constitution, it cannot be given by 
agreement. (Re Agricultural Products 
Marketing Act, [1978 at 1232) 
Umpire of 
Federalism 
The Supreme Court sees its 
role as one of an arbiter of 
intergovernmental relations 
However, the proposed Act reaches 
beyond such matters and descends into the 
detailed regulation of all aspects of trading 
in securities, a matter that has long been 
viewed as provincial. (Re Securities Act, 
[2011]) 
Coding is performed manually by the researcher. Each reference is read in detail for the 
narrative elements described above. When an element is present (in the judgment of the 
coder), the sentence is tagged according to the appropriate theme. Once coding was 
complete, all coded segments were exported from QDA Miner and checked for validity. 
Coded segments were checked first by case to remove any false/erroneous codes, and 
then checked again by theme to ensure internal consistency. 
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A Note About Wording 
It is not the case that all sentences containing the word “federalism” will be coded as 
“federalism”. Likewise, it’s not necessary that a sentence possess the work “federalism” 
to be coded as such. Coding cannot be too dependent on specific words (i.e. we cannot 
assume semantic independence and therefore automatically code specific words) as the 
Court often uses language that implies the opposite of a code: “Its function is to limit the 
Governor in Council’s otherwise broad discretion to appoint judges”. Coding this as 
“inter-institutional” would mistakenly apply a code to a sentence that conveys the 
opposite meaning. 
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